Mate Choices Can Be Complex, But Are They Oedipal Complex?

Posted on September 7, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

Theory is arguably the most important part of research. A good theory helps researchers formulate better research questions as well as understand the results that their research projects end up producing.I’ve said this so often that expressing the idea is closer to a reflex than a thought at this point. Unfortunately, “theories” in psychology – if we can even call them theories – are frequently of poor quality, if not altogether absent from research, leading to similarly poorly formulated projects and explanations. Evolutionary theory offers an escape from this theoretically shallowness, and it’s the major reason the field appeals to me. I find myself somewhat disappointed, then, to see a new paper published in Evolutionary Psychology that appears to be, well, atheoretical.

No, I’m not mad; I’m just disappointed…

The paper was ostensibly looking at whether or not human children sexually imprint on the facial traits of their opposite sex parent, or, more specifically (for those of you that don’t know about imprinting):

Positive sexual imprinting has been defined as a sexual preference for individuals possessing the characteristics of one’s parents… It is said to be a result of acquiring sexual preferences via exposure to the parental phenotype during a sensitive period in early childhood.

The first sentence of that definition seems to me to be unnecessary. One could have preferences for characteristics that one’s parents also happen to possess without those preferences being the result of any developmental mechanism that uses parental phenotype as its input. So I’d recommend using the second part of the definition, which seems fine, as far as describing sexual imprinting on parents goes. As the definition suggests, such a mechanism would require (1) a specified developmental window during which the imprinting takes place (i.e. the preferences would not be acquired prior to or after that time, and would be relatively resistant to change afterwards) and (2) that mechanism to be specifically focused on parental features.

So how did Marcinkowska & Rantala (2012) go about testing this hypothesis? Seventy subjects, their sexual partner, and their opposite sex parent (totaling 210 people) were each photographed from straight ahead and in profile. These subjects were also asked to report about their upbringing as a child. Next, a new group of subjects were presented with an array of pictures: on one side of the array was a picture of one of the opposite sex parents; on the other side there were four pictures, one of which was the partner of that parent’s child and three of which were controls. The new subjects were asked to rate how similar the picture of the parent was to the pictures of the people on the other side of the display.

The results showed that the group of independent raters felt that a man’s mother resembled slightly more closely his later partner than the controls did. The results also showed that the same raters did not feel that a woman’s father more closely resembled her later partner than the control did. Neither of these findings were in any way related to the self-reports that subjects had delivered about their upbringing either. If you’ve been following along so far, you might be curious as to what these results have to do with a sexual imprinting hypothesis. As far as I can tell, the answer is a resounding, “nothing”.

Discussion: Never mind…

Let’s consider what these results don’t tell us: they certainly don’t speak to the matter of preferences. As Marcinkowska & Rantala (2012) note, actual mating preferences can be constrained by other factors. Everyone in the population might wish to monopolize the matings of a series of beautiful others, but if those beautiful others have different plans, that desire will not be fulfilled. Since the initial definition of imprinting specifically referenced preferences – not actual choices – the findings would have very little relevance to the matter of imprinting no matter how the data fell out. It’s worse than that, however: this study didn’t even attempt to look for any developmental window either. The authors seemed to just assume it existed without any demonstration that it actually does.

What’s particularly peculiar about this oversight is that, in the discussion, the authors note they did not look at any adoptive families. This suggests that the authors at least realized there were ways of testing to see if this developmental window even exists, but didn’t seem to bother running the required tests. A better test – one that might suggest such a developmental window exists – would be to test preferences of adoptive or step-children towards the features of their biological and adoptive/step-parents. If the imprinting hypothesis was true, you would expect that adoptive/step-children would prefer the characteristics of their adoptive/step-parents, not their biological ones. Further, this research could be run with respect to the time at which the new parent came into the picture (and the old one left). If there is a critical developmental window, you should only expect to see this effect when the new parent entered into the equation at a certain age; not before or beyond that point.

The problems don’t even end there, however. As I mentioned previously, this paper appears atheoretical in nature, in that the authors give absolutely no reason as to why one would expect to find a sexual imprinting mechanism in the first place, why it would operate in early childhood, let alone why that mechanism would be inclined to imprint on one’s close, biological kin. What the precise fitness benefits to such a mechanism would be are entirely unclear to me, though, at the very least, I could see it carrying fitness costs in that it might heighten the probability of incest taking place. Further, if this mechanism is presumably,active in all members of our species, and each person is looking to mate with someone who resembles their opposite sex parent, it would seem that such a preference might actively disincline people from having what would be otherwise adaptive matings. Lacking any theoretical explanation for any of this, the purpose of the research seems very confusing.

On the plus side, you can still add it to your resume, and we all know how important publications are.

All that said, even if research did find that people tended to be attracted to the traits of their opposite sex parent, such a finding could, in principle, be explained by sexual selection. Offspring inherent genes from their parents that both contributed to their parent’s phenotype as well as genes that contributed to their parent’s psychological preferences. If preferences were not similarly inherited, sexual selection would be impossible and ornaments like the peacock’s tail could never have come into existence. So, presuming your parents found each other at least attractive enough to get together and mate, you could expect their offspring to resemble them both physically and psychologically to some extent. When those offspring are then making their own mate choices, you might then expect them to make a similar set of choices (all else being equal, of course).

What can be said for the study is that it’s a great example of how not to do research. Don’t just assume the effect you’re looking to study exists; demonstrate that it does. Don’t assume that it works in a particular way in the event that it actually exists either. Most importantly, don’t formulate your research project in absence of a clearly stated theory that explains why such an effect would exist and, further, why it would work the way you expect it might. You should also try and rule out alternative explanations for whatever findings you’re expecting. Without good theory, the quality of your research will likely suffer, and suffer badly.

References: Marcinkowska, U.M., & Rantala, M.J. (2012). Sexual Imprinting on Facial Traits of Opposite-Sex Parents in Humans. Evolutionary Psychology, 10, 621-630

No, Really; What About The Men?

Posted on August 21, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

If you’re the kind of person who has frequented internet discussion boards, you’ll know that debates over sexism can get a bit heated. You might also have noticed that many problems men faced are not infrequently dismissed on the grounds of being relative unimportant when compared to issues women face. One common form this dismissal takes is the purposely misspelled, “what about teh poor menz?”, since everyone on the internet is automatically intellectually twelve. In fact, the whole sexism debate is often treated like a zero-sum game, where reducing sexism against one sex makes the other one worse off. We could debate whether that’s the case or not, but that’s not my goal today. Today, my goal is to ask, quite seriously, what about the men?

“Check out the male privilege on that guy”

There were two posts on Reddit that inspired this post: the first is this story of President Obama reacting to the Akin quote regarding rape. Here’s what Obama had to say:

“The views expressed were offensive,” said Obama. “Rape is rape. And the idea that we should be parsing and qualifying and slicing what types of rape we are talking about doesn’t make sense to the American people and certainly doesn’t make sense to me. So what I think these comments do underscore is why we shouldn’t have a bunch of politicians, a majority of whom are men, making health care decisions on behalf of women.” [emphasis mine]

Now, it seems to me that what we should want when it comes to our elected official writing legislation regarding our health care has nothing to do with gender per se; it should have everything to do with the policies themselves, not their proposers. For instance, imagine that Akin was a woman who uttered the same nonsensical quote about rape pregnancies: would that be an opportune time to comment about how women in general can’t be trusted to make their own health care decisions? I’d think not, yet it seemed to be a fine time to draw attention to the male gender.

Here’s the second post: the radically different prices that men and women can be charged for admission to certain venues. This is about as blatant case of sexism as you could think of. It’s also exceedingly common: bars and clubs hold “ladies nights” where women are charged less – if they’re charged at all – for entry and drinks on no basis other than gender. What you rarely, if ever, find is the reverse, where men are given a pass and women are required to pay a higher premium. Now we could argue about whether this is a good business move (whether it ends up profiting the clubs or not) but that’s not the point here. I doubt many people would accept women being charged higher tuition premiums to attend college, for instance, if it ended up causing the college to profit.

One could also argue about whether ladies nights can be said to do men real harm. Complaining about them might even be conceptualized as a first-world problem, or a whiny privileged male problem. Whether they do or not is still besides the point, which is this: it’s probable that even when a policy hurts or discriminates against men, that harm or discrimination will be taken less seriously than a comparable one directed against women. There is likely be some psychological module devoted to taking into account victim characteristics when assessing victimhood claims, and gender would appear to be a very relevant variable. In fact, I would predict that gender will be an important variable above and beyond the extent to which the sexes historically faced different costs from different acts (rape, for instance, entails the additional risk of pregnancy from a male-on-female case, but not the reverse, so we might expect people to say a woman getting raped is worse than a man being raped).

“It’s illegal to talk on your cell while driving without having my number”

Some intriguing data come to us from Mustard (2001), who examined roughly 80,000 federal sentences across different racial groups, men, and women. Doing so requires controlling for a number of relevant variables, such as offense type and severity, past criminal record, and so on, since the variable of interest is, “the extent to which an individual who is in the same district court, commits the same offense, and has the same criminal history and offense level as another person received a different sentence on the basis on race, ethnicity or gender”. Mustard (2001) found that, after controlling for these variables, some of the usual racial bias come through: sentences that were handed out to blacks and Hispanics were, on average, 5.5 and 4.5 months longer than comparable sentences handled out to whites. Seems like a run-of-the-mill case of discrimination so far, I’m sure. However, the male-female discrepancy didn’t fair any better: men, on average, also received sentences 5.5 months longer than women did. Huh; it would seem that the male-female bias is about as bad, if not worse, than racial biases in this case.

It’s potentially worth noting that these disparities could come about for two reasons: sentencing within the guidelines – just differently between genders – or departing from the sentencing guidelines. For example, both men and women could be sentenced within the appropriate guidelines, but women tend to be sentenced towards the low end of the sentencing range while men are sentenced towards the high end. Granted, bias is still bias, whether it’s due to departures or sticking to the accepted range of sentencing length, but, as it turns out, roughly 70% of the gender difference could be accounted for by departures from sentencing guidelines; specifically, women were more often given downward departures from the guidelines, relative to men. When blacks and Hispanics are granted a downward departure, it averages about 5.5 months less than departures given to whites; for women, the average departure was almost 7 months greater than for men. Further, when the option of no jail time is available, females are also more likely to be granted no time, relative to men (just as whites are to blacks).

It’s also worth noting, as Mustard (2001) does, that these disparities were only examined at the level of sentencing. It would not be much of a leap to consider the possibility that similar disparities existed in other aspects of the moral domain, such as suspicion regarding a perpetrator, the devotion of resources to certain varieties of crime, or even assessments concerning whether a crime took place at all. Further still, it doesn’t consider the everyday social, non-criminal, extent to which men may not given certain considerations that women would. If that is the case, the effects of these biases that we see in this paper are likely to be cumulative, and the extent of the differences we see at time of sentencing might only reflect a part of the overall discriminatory pattern. Simply noticing the pattern, however, does not explain it, which means it’s time to consider some potential reasons why women may be assessed more positively than men when it comes to handing out punishment.

Whether he wins or loses here, he still loses.

Perhaps the most obvious issue is one I’ve touched on previously: men could be treating women better (or avoiding punishing them harshly) in hopes of receiving sexual favors later. In this regard, women are often able to offer men something that other men simply can’t, which makes them a particularly appealing social asset. However, such an explanation is likely incomplete, as it would only be able to account for cases in which men treated women preferentially, not cases where women treated other women preferentially as well. While the current data doesn’t speak to that issue (the interaction between the sex of the judge, sex of the convict, and sentencing length was not examined), I wouldn’t doubt it plays a significant role in accounting for this bias.

Another potential explanation is that men may in fact be more likely to be dangerous, leading people, men and women alike, to assume men are more likely to be guilty, acted more intentionally, and should be punished more severely (among other things). If the former proposition is true, then such a bias would likely be useful on the whole. However, that does not imply it would be useful or accurate for any one given case, especially if other, potentially more useful, sources of information are available (such as criminal history). Gender would only be a proxy for the other variables people wish to assess, which means its use would likely lead to inaccurate assessments in many individual cases.

Finally, one other issue returns to the point I was making last post: if women are, all things considered, better targets of social investment for other people relative to men, punishing them harshly is unlikely to lead to a good strategic outcome. Simply put, punishing women may be socially costlier than punishing men, so people might shy away from it when possible. While this is unlikely to be an exhaustive list of potential explanations for this discriminatory bias, it seems a plausible starting position. Now the only thing left to do is to get people to care about solving (and seeing) the problem in the first place.

References: Mustard, D. B. (2001). Racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. federal courts. Journal of Law and Economics, 44, 285-314 DOI: 10.1086/320276

No Pain, No Gain: Victimhood And Selfishness

Posted on August 17, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

If you’re the kind of person who has an active social life, including things like friends and intimate sexual relationships, then you’re probably the type of person who has something better to do than read this page. In the event you’re reading this and also manage to have those kinds of relationships, you might have noticed that people who have recently (or not so recently) been hurt will sometimes go a bit off the rails. Perhaps they opt to drink to the point of blacking out and burning down their neighbor’s pets, or they might take a more subtle approach and simply become a slightly different person for a time (a little more extroverted, a little less concerned about safe sex, or just ball up in their closet and eat ice cream for days on end). I’ve kind of touched on this issue before when considering the function of depression, so today I’m going to shift gears a bit.

Right after I treat myself to some retail therapy…

I’ve written about victimhood several times in the past, and today I’d like to tie two pieces of information together to help understand a third. The first piece to consider is the Banker’s Paradox: people need to judge where to invest their social capital in so as to get the most from their investment over the long-term. Part of this assessment involves considering (a) whom your social capital would be most valuable for and (b) how likely the recipient of that investment would be to return in. Certain classes of people make better investment targets than others, depending on the context you currently find yourself (and them) in. The second piece of information involves how people attribute blame to victims and heroes: victims (conceptualized as someone that has a bad thing happen to them) are blamed less than heroes (conceptualized as someone who does good deeds) for later identical misdeeds.

In light of the Banker’s Paradox, the second finding makes more sense: victims may often make better social investment targets than heroes, at least with regard to their need for the assistance. Accordingly, if you’re looking to invest in someone and foster a relationship with them, casting them in a negative moral light probably won’t go very far towards achieving that goal. At the very least, if victims make better investment targets for other people, even if you aren’t looking to invest in that victim yourself, you run the risk of drawing condemnation from those other parties by siding against the victim they’re trying to invest in. To clarify this point, consider the story of Robin Hood; even if you were not benefiting directly from Robin stealing from the rich and giving to the poor, condemning him for theft would be unlikely to win you much support from the lower class he was helping. Unless you were looking to experience a public embarrassment and/or beating, keeping quiet about the whole stealing thing might be in your best interests.

With that in mind, it’s time to turn this analysis towards the perspective of the victimized party, who, up until now, has been treated in a relatively passive way; as someone who things happen to, or someone who receives investment. Third parties, in this scenario, would invest socially in victims because the victims hold real or potential social value. This value could in turn be strategically leveraged by victis in order to achieve other useful outcomes for themselves. For instance, if victims are less likely to be morally condemned for their actions by others, this would give victims a bit of moral wiggle room to behave more selfishly towards others while more effectively avoiding the consequences of their actions. As summed up by The Joker in The Dark Knight, “If you’re good at something [or valuable to someone], never do it [or be that] for free”.

“Also, don’t exceed the recommended daily dosage on your drugs”.

This hypothesis was inadvertently tested by Zitek et al (2010), who examined the link between perceiving oneself as a victim and subsequent feelings of entitlement. I say inadvertently, because, as is usually the case in psychology research, their experiment was carried out with no theory worth mentioning. Essentially, this research was done a hunch, and the results were in no way explained. While I’d prefer not to have to harp on this point so frequently, it’s just too frequent of an issue to ignore. Moving on…

In the first experiment, Zitek et al (2010) asked two groups of subject to either (a) write about a time they were bored or (b) write about a time life treated them unfairly. Following this, subjects were asked three questions relating to their sense of entitlement. Lastly, subjects were given a chance to help the experimenter with an additional task, ostensibly unrelated to the current experiment. This final measure could be considered an indirect assessment of the subject’s current altruistic tendencies. When it came to the measures of entitlement, subjects who wrote about an unfair instance in their life rated themselves as more entitled than the control group (4.34 vs 3.85 out of 7, respectively). Further, subjects were less likely to help the experimenter out with the additional task in the unfair condition, relative t the bored one (60% vs 81% of subjects helped, respectively).

A second experiment altered the entitlement questions somewhat and also asked about the subject’s selfish behavioral intentions in lieu of asking subjects to help out on the additional task. Zitek et al (2010) also asked about other aspects of the subject’s current negative emotions, such as anger. The results for this experiment showed that subjects in the unfair condition were slightly more likely to report selfish behavioral intentions (3.78) than subjects in the bored condition (3.42). Similarly, subjects in the unfair condition also reported a greater sense of entitlement (4.91) relative to the bored group (4.54). The subject’s current feelings of anger and frustration did not mediate this effect significantly, whereas feelings of entitlement did, suggesting there is something special about entitlement in this regard.

One final experiment got a little more personal: instead of just asking subjects about a time life was unfair to them, an experiment was run where subjects would lose out on a prize either fairly or unfairly. In the unfair loss condition, what appeared to be a computer glitch prevented subjects from being able to win, whereas in the fair loss condition the task subjects were given was designed to appear as if they were simply unable to solve it successfully in the time allotted. After this loss, subjects were asked how they would allocate money for a hypothetical experiment between themselves and another player, contingent on them outperforming that other player 70% of the time. Again, the same effect popped up, where subjects in the unfair loss condition suggested they should get more money in the hypothetical experiment ($3.93 out of 6) relative to the fair loss condition ($3.64). While that might not seem like much of a difference, when considering only the most selfish allocations of money, those in the unfair condition were more than twice as likely (19%) to make such divisions (8% in the bored group).

The forth experiment might have got a little out of hand…

So, being a victim would seem to make people slightly more selfish in these cases. The size of this effect wasn’t particularly impressive in the current experiments, but the measures of victimization were rather tame; two involved experiences long past, and the third involved victimization at the hands of a relatively impersonal force – a computer glitch. More recent and more intense victimization might do something to change the extent of this effect, but that will have to be a matter for future research to sort out; research that might be a little difficult to conduct, as most review boards aren’t too keen on approving research that aims to cause significant discomfort for the subjects.

That said, many people might have easily made the opposite prediction: that being victimized would lead people to become more altruistic and less selfish, perhaps based in some proximate empathy model (i.e. “I don’t want to see people hurt the way I was”). While I certainly wouldn’t want to write off such a possible outcome, given the proper context, discussing that possibility will be a job for another day. What I will suggest is that we shouldn’t expect victimhood to make people do one and only one thing; we should expect their behavior will be highly dependent on their contexts. After all, the appropriateness of a behavior can only be determined contextually, and behaving selfishly with reckless abandon is still a risky proposition, victim or not.

References: Zitek EM, Jordan AH, Monin B, & Leach FR (2010). Victim entitlement to behave selfishly. Journal of personality and social psychology, 98 (2), 245-55 PMID: 20085398

Why All The Fuss About Equality?

Posted on August 4, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

In my last post, I discussed why the term “inequality aversion” is a rather inelegant way to express certain human motivations. A desire to not be personally disadvantaged is not the same thing as a desire for equity, more generally. Further, people readily tolerate and create inequality when it’s advantageous for them to do so, and such behavior is readily understandable from an evolutionary perspective. What isn’t as easily understandable – at least not as immediately – is why equality should matter at all. Most research on the subject of equality would appear to just take it for granted (more-or-less) that equality matters without making a concerted attempt to understand why that should be the case. This paper isn’t much different.

On the plus side, at least they’re consistent.

The paper by Raihani & McAuliffe (2012) sought to disentangle two possible competing motives when it comes to punishing behavior: inequality and reciprocity. The authors note that previous research examining punishment often confounds these two possible motives. For instance, let’s say you’re playing a standard prisoner’s dilemma game: you have a choice to either cooperate or defect, and let’s further say that you opt for cooperation. If your opponent defects, not only do you lose out on the money you would have made had he cooperated, but your opponent also ends up with more money than you do overall. If you decided to punish the defector, the question arises of whether that punishment is driven by the loss of money, the aversion to the disadvantageous inequality, or some combination of the two.

To separate the two motives out, Raihani & McAuliffe (2012) used a taking game. Subjects would play the role of either player 1 or player 2 in one of three condition. In all conditions, player 1 was given an initial endowment of seventy cents; player 2, on the other hand, started out with either ten cents, thirty cents, or seventy cents. In all conditions, player 2 was then given the option of taking twenty cents from player 1, and following that decision player 1 was then given an option of playing ten cents to reduce player 2′s payoff by thirty cents. The significance of these conditions is that, in the first two, if player 2 takes the twenty cents, no disadvantageous inequality is created for player 1. However, in the last condition, by taking the twenty cents, player 2 creates that inequality. While the overall loss of money across conditions is identical, the context of that loss in terms of equality is not. The question, then, is how often player 1 would punish player 2.

In the first two conditions, where no disadvantageous inequality was created for player 1, player 1 didn’t punish significantly more whether player 2 had taken money or not (approximately 13%). In the third treatment, where player 2′s taking did create that kind of inequality, player 1 was now far more likely to pay to punish (approximately 40%). So this is a pretty neat result, and it mirrors past work that came at the question from the opposite angle (Xiao & Houser, 2010; see here). The real question, though, concerns how we are to interpret this finding. These results, in and of themselves, don’t tell us a whole lot about why equality matters when it comes to punishment decisions.

They also doesn’t tell me much about this terrible itch I’ve been experiencing lately, but that’s a post for another day.

I think it’s worth noting that the study still does, despite it’s best efforts, confound losing money and generating inequality; in no condition can player 2 create disadvantageous inequality for player 1 without taking money away as well. Accordingly, I can’t bring myself to agree with the authors, who conclude:

Together, these results suggest that disadvantageous inequality is the driving force motivating punishment, implying that the proximate motives underpinning human punishment might therefore stem from inequality aversion rather than the desire to reciprocate losses.

It could still well be the case that player one would rather not have twenty cents taken from them, thank you very much, but don’t reciprocate with punishment for other reasons. To use a more real-life context, let’s say you have a guest come to your house. At some point after that guest has left, you discover that he apparently also left with some of the cash you had been saving to buy whatever expensive thing you had your eye on at the time. When it came to deciding whether or not you desired to see that person punished for what they did, precisely how well off they were relative to you might not be your first concern. The theft would not, I imagine, automatically become OK in the event that the guy only took your money because you were richer than he was. A psychology that was designed to function in such a manner would leave one wide-open for exploitation by selfish others.

However, how well off you were, relative to how needy the person in question was, might have a larger effect in the minds of other third party condemners. The sentiment behind the tale of Robin Hood serves as an example towards that end: stealing from the rich is less likely to be condemned by others than stealing from one of lower standing. If other third parties are less likely, for whatever reason, to support your decision to punish another individual in contexts where you’re advantaged over the person being punished, punishment immediately risks becoming more costly. At that point. it might be less costly to tolerate the theft rather than risking condemnation by others for taking action against it.

What might be better referred to as, “The Metallica V. Napster Principle”.

One final issue I have with the paper is a semantic one: the authors label the act of player 2 taking money as cheating, which doesn’t fit my preferred definition (or, frankly, any definition of cheating I’ve ever seen). I favor the Tooby and Cosmides definition where a cheater is defined as “…an individual who accepts a benefit without satisfying the requirements that provision of that benefit was made contingent upon.” As there was no condition required for player 2 to be allowed to take money from player 1, it could hardly be considered an act of cheating. This seemingly minor issue, however, might actually hold some real significance, in the Freudian sense of the word.

To me, that choice of phrasing implies that the authors realize that, as I previously suggested, player 1s would really prefer if player 2s didn’t take any money from them; after all, why would they? More money is better than less. This highlights, for me, the very real and very likely possibility that what player 1s were actually punishing was having money taken from them, rather than the inequality, but they were only willing to punish in force when that punishment could more successfully be justified to others.

References: Raihani NJ, & McAuliffe K (2012). Human punishment is motivated by inequity aversion, not a desire for reciprocity. Biology letters PMID: 22809719

Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2010). When equality trumps reciprocity Journal of Economic Psychology, 31, 456-470 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2010.02.001

Inequality Aversion Aversion

Posted on July 27, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

While I’ve touched on the issues surrounding the concept of “fairness” before, there’s one particular term that tends to follow the concept around like a bad case of fleas: inequality aversion. Following the proud tradition of most psychological research, the term manages to both describe certain states of affairs (kind of) without so much as an iota of explanatory power, while at the same time placing the emphasis on, conceptually, the wrong variable. In order to better understand why (some) people (some of the time) behave “fairly” towards others, we’re going to need to address both of the problems with the term. So, let’s tear the thing down to the foundation and see what we’re working with.

“Be careful; this whole thing could collapse for, like, no reason”

Let’s start off with the former issue: when people talk about inequality aversion, what are they referring to? Unsurprisingly, the term would appear to refer to the fact that people tend to show some degree of concern for how resources are divided among multiple parties. We can use the classic dictator game as a good example: when given full power over the ability to divide some amount of money, dictator players often split the money equally (or near-equally) between themselves and another player. Further, the receivers in the dictator games also tend to both respond to equal offers with favorable remarks and respond to unequal offered with negative remarks (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008). The remaining issue, then, concerns how are we to interpret findings like this, and why should we interpret them in such a fashion

Simply stating that people are averse to inequality is, at best, a restatement of those findings. At worst, it’s misleading, as people will readily tolerate inequality when it benefits them. Take the dictators in the example above: many of them (in fact, the majority of them) appear perfectly willing to make unequal offers so long as they’re on the side that’s benefiting from that inequality. This phenomena is also illustrated by the fact that, when given access to asymmetrical knowledge, almost all people take advantage of that knowledge for their own benefit (Pillutla & Murnighan,1995). As a final demonstration, take two groups of subjects; each subject given the task of assigning themselves and another subject to one of two tasks: the first task is described as allowing the subject a chance to win $30, while the other task has no reward and is described as being dull and boring.

In the first of these two groups, since subjects can assign themselves to whichever task they want, it’s perhaps unsurprising that 90% of the subjects assigned themselves to the more attractive task; that’s just simple, boring, self-interest. Making money is certainly preferable to being bored out of your mind, but automatically assigning yourself to the positive task might not be considered the fairest option The second group, however, flipped a coin in private first to determine how they would assign tasks, and following that flip made their assignment. In this group, since coins are impartial and all, it should not come as a surprise that…90% of the subjects again assigned themselves to the positive task when all was said and done (Batson, 2008). How very inequality averse and fair of them.

“Heads I win; Tails I also win.”

A recent (and brief) paper by Houser and Xiao (2010) examined the extent to which people are apparently just fine with inequality, but from the opposite direction: taking money away instead of offering it. In their experiment, subjects played a standard dictator game at first. The dictator had $10 to divide however they chose. Following this division, both the dictator and the receiver were given an additional $2. Finally, the receiver was given the opportunity to pay a fixed cost of $1 for the ability to reduce the dictator’s payoff by any amount. Another experimental group took part in the same task, except the dictator was passive in the second experiment; the division of the $10 was made at random by a computer program, representing simple chance factors.

A general preference to avoid inequality would, one could predict, be relatively unconcerned with the nature of that inequality: whether it came about through chance factors or intentional behavior should be irrelevant. For instance, if I don’t like drinking coffee, I should be relatively averse to the idea whether I was randomly assigned to drink it or whether someone intentionally assigned me to drink it. However, when it came to the receivers deciding whether or not to “correct” the inequality, precisely how that inequality came about mattered: when the division was randomly determined, about 20% of subjects paid the $1 in order to reduce the other player’s payoff, as opposed to the 54% of subjects who paid the cost in the intentional condition (Note: both of these percentages refer to cases in which the receiver was given less than half of the dictator’s initial endowment). Further still, the subjects in the random treatment deducted less, on average, than the subjects in the intention treatment.

The other interesting part about this punishment, as it pertains to inequality aversion, is that most people who did punish did not just make the payoffs even; the receivers deducted money from the dictators to the point that the receivers ended up with more money overall in the end. Rather than seeking equality, the punishing receivers brought about inequality that favored themselves, to the tune of 73% of the punishers in the intentional treatment and 66% in the random treatment (which did not differ significantly). The authors conclude:

…[O]ur data suggest that people are more willing to tolerate inequality when it is cause by nature than when it is intentionally created by humans. Nevertheless, in both cases, a large majority of punishers attempt to achieve advantageous inequality. (p.22)

Now that the demolition is over, we can start rebuilding.

This punishment finding also sheds some conceptual light on why inequality aversion puts the emphasis on the wrong variable: people are not averse to inequality, per se, but rather seem to be averse to punishment and condemnation, and one way of avoiding punishment is to make equal offers (of the dictators that made an equal or better offer, only 4.5% were punished). This finding highlights the problem of assuming a preference based on an outcome: just because some subjects make equal offers in a dictator game, it does not follow that they have a genuine preference for making equal offers. Similarly, just because men and women (by mathematical definition) are going to have the same number of opposite-sex sexual partners, it does not follow that this outcome was obtained because they desired the same number.

That is all, of course, not to say that preferences for equality don’t exist at all, it’s just that while people may have some motivations that incline them towards equality in some cases, those motivations come with some rather extreme caveats. People do not appear averse to inequality generally, but rather appear strategically interested in (at least) appearing fair. Then again, fairness really is a fuzzy concept, isn’t it?

References: Batson, C.D. (2008). Moral masquerades: Experimental exploration of the nature of moral motivation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7, 51-66

Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2008). Anticipated Verbal Feedback Induces Altruistic Behavior. Evolution and Human Behavior DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.001

Houser, D., & Xiao, E. (2010). Inequality-seeking punishment Economic Letters DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.008

Pillutla, M.M. & Murnighan, J.K. (1995). Being fair or appearing fair: Strategic behavior in ultimatum bargaining. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 1408-1426.

Some Research I Was Going To Do

Posted on July 13, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

I have a number of research projects lined up for my upcoming dissertation, and, as anyone familiar with my ideas can tell you, they’re all brilliant. You can imagine my disappointment, then, to find out that not only had one of my experiments been scooped by another author three years prior, but they found the precise patterns of results I had predicted. Adding insult to injury, the theoretical underpinnings of the work are all but non-existent (as is the case in the vast majority of the psychology research literature), meaning I got scooped by someone who doesn’t seem to have a good idea why they found the results they did. My consolation prize is that I get to write about it earlier than expected, so there’s that, I suppose…

What? No, I’m not crying; I just got something in my eye. Or allergies. Whatever.

The experiment itself (Morewedge, 2009) resembles a Turing test. Subjects come into the lab to play a series of ultimatum games. One person has to divide a pot of $3 one of three ways – $2.25/$0.75 (favoring either the divider or the receiver) or evenly ($1.50 for each) – and the receiver can either accept or reject these offers. The variable of interest, however, is not whether the receiver will accept the money; it’s whether the receiver perceives the offer to have been made by a real person or a computer program, as all the subjects were informed beforehand that the proposers they would encounter were drawn randomly from a pool of computer programs or real players. In essence, the experiment was examining whether or not participants perceived they were playing with an intentional agent (a human) or a non-intentional agent, representing chance (a computer), contingent on the outcome. A brilliant experiment that I thought of first, a mere three years after it had already been published.

Overall, the subjects were no more or less likely to suggest they were playing against a person or a computer, and were also no more likely to see a person or a computer as being responsible when they received an even split. However, this was not the case across the other two offers: when subjects received an unusually positive offer ($2.25 for themselves), they tended to attribute this offer to a computer; when the offer was negative ($0.75 for themselves) they overwhelmingly attributed it to a person. When causation was ambiguous, “harm” (used rather loosely here) seemed to trigger the perception of an intentional agent, whereas a benefit tended to have the opposite effect; a decrease in perceptions of intentionality.

This pattern of results could be explained by referencing some kind of self-interested motive: given what we know about people (they seem to prefer more money to less), an unusually altruistic offer is just that – unusual. It would seem more likely that selfish offers come from self-interested agents, rather than an altruistic offer coming from a selfish agent. In an attempt to remove such thinking from (conscious) consideration, a second experiment was run. This time, the person deciding how the pot would be split had no personal stake in the decision; that is to say, subjects were told that their partners would not receive any payment from the games. No matter whether the proposer offered $0.75 or $2.25, no matter whether the offer was accepted or rejected, proposers made no money. However, the results in this case still looked similar: selfish offers were seen as being made predominately by people, and altruistic offers were seen as being made predominately by computers.

But so help me if a computer has been screwing me over again…

In the next two experiments Morewedge (2009) got a bit more explicit about the role of chance. In the first case, subjects came into the experiment and met a confederate before both were taken into separate rooms and seated at computers. On the computer was a circle divided up into five sections with a spinning arrow in the middle. Each of the five sections of the circle was filled with one of two colors, with the numbers of each color varying from one to four across each spin (so the circle could have 4 blue and 1 yellow slots in one round, then 3 blue and 2 yellow in the next, and so on). Subjects chose one color for the experiment beforehand, and if the spinner landed on their color in any given round, they would win the amount of money listed on the screen; if it didn’t land on their color, they would lose the amount on the screen. These amounts varied between zero and one dollar in $0.25 increments.

The subjects were informed of two other things: first, that the confederate was in a similar position (the confederate had picked one of the two colors as well, so they might both have the same color or not), and second, that the confederate could control the outcome of five of the forty rounds that would be played. It was the subject’s job to report the extent to which they felt the confederate had used their influence on each round. When the subjects had lost money, they tended to attribute responsibility for the action more towards the confederate than chance, and this tendency was exacerbated as the monetary stakes got higher. This effect is all the more interesting when considering the fact that subjects couldn’t be sure whether the confederate had similar or divergent interests. If they had the same interests, the confederate would be hurting both of them if he used his influence to purposely lose. Also of interest is that, when asked to estimate how much money they had ended up with – $5 in all cases; the initial endowment they were given – subjects underestimated, reporting that ended up with only $2.89 on average. They were either bad at math, or their memory was distorted towards recalling losses selectively.

Finally, the last experiment used a paradigm similar to that typically used for children: how long participants would spend looking at something. In this case, that something was information presented to the participant following a round with the spinner. The set up was similar, except the subjects were told a confederate could control half of the outcomes, and after each round the subject was told whether the confederate had controlled the round or not. Once presented with this information, subjects had to press a button to proceed to the next screen, and the amount of time they waited before pressing that button was used as a measure of the time participants were processing the information on the screen. Participants ended up spending more time looking at the screen when it was revealed that the confederate was responsible for their win, relative to being responsible for their loss, but looked equally as long when chance was implicated as responsible. This result could tentatively suggest that participants found it surprising that the confederate was responsible for their wins, implying that the more automatic process might be one of blaming others for losses.

For example, I’d be surprised if he still has that suit and that prostitute after the dice land.

Now to the theory. I will give credit where credit is due: Morewedge (2009) does at least suggest there might have been evolutionary advantages to such a bias, but promptly fails to elaborate on them in any substantial way. The first possible explanation given is that this bias could be used to defer responsibility for negative outcomes from oneself to others, which is an odd explanation given that the subjects in this experiment had no responsibility to defer. The second possible explanation is that people might attribute negative outcomes to others in order to not feel sad, which is, frankly, silly. The forth (going out of order) explanation is that such a bias might just represent a common a mild form of “disordered” thinking concerning a persecution complex, which is really no explanation at all. The third, least silly explanation, is that:

“By assuming the presence of antagonist, one may better be able to avoid a quick repetition of the unpleasant event one has just experienced” (p. 543)

Here, though, I feel Morewedge is making the mistake of assuming past selection pressures resembled the conditions set up in the experiment. I’m not quite sure how else to read that section, nor do I feel that experimental paradigm was particularly representative of past selection pressures or relevant environmental contexts

Now, if Morewedge had placed his findings in some framework concerning how social actions are all partly a result of intentional and chance factors, how perpetrators tend to conceal or downplay their immoral actions or intentions, how victims need to convince third parties to punish others who haven’t wronged them directly, and how certain inputs (such as harm) might better allow victims to persuade others, he’d have a very nice paper indeed. Unfortunately, he misses the strategic, functional element to these biases. When taken out of context, such biases can look “disordered” indeed, in much the same way that, when put underwater, my car seems disordered in its use as a submarine.

References: Morewedge CK (2009). Negativity bias in attribution of external agency. Journal of experimental psychology. General, 138 (4), 535-45 PMID: 19883135

Social Banking

Posted on July 9, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

“Bankers have a limited amount of money, and must choose who to invest it in. Each choice is a gamble: taken together, they must ultimately yield a net profit, or the banker will go out of business. This set of incentives yield a common complaint about the banking system: that bankers will only lend money to individuals who don’t need it. The harsh irony of the banker’s paradox is this: just when individuals need the money most desperately, they are also the poorest credit risk and, therefore, the least likely to be selected to receive a loan” – Tooby & Cosmides (1996, p. 131)

While perhaps more of a set of unfortunately circumstances than an actual paradox (in true Alanis Morrissette fashion), the banker’s paradox can be a useful metaphor for understanding social interactions. Specifically, it can help guide predictions as to how we would expect the victim/perpetrator/third party dynamic to play itself out, and, more importantly, help explain why we would have such expectations. The time and energy we can invest in others socially – in terms of building and maintaining friendships – is a lot like money; we cannot spend it in two places at once. Given that we have a limited budget with which to build and maintain relationships, it’s of vital importance for some cognitive system to assess the probability of social returns from its investment; likewise, individuals have a vested interest in manipulating that assessment in others in order to further their goals.

And, for the record, reading my site will yield a large social return on your investment. Promise.

The first matter to touch on is why a third party would feel compelled to get involved in other people’s disputes. One reason might be the potential for the third party to gain accurate information about the likely behavior of others. If person A claims that person B is a liar, and it’s true, person C could potentially benefit from knowing that. Of course, if it’s not true, then person C would likely have been better off ignoring that information. Further, if the behavior of person B towards person A lacks predictive value of how person B will behave towards person C, then the usefulness of such information is again compromised. For instance, while an older sibling might physically dominate a younger sibling, it does not mean that older sibling will in turn dominate his other classmates or his friends. Given the twin possibilities of either receiving inaccurate information or accurate but useless information, it remains questionable as to how much third party involvement this hypothesis could explain.

Beyond information value, however, third parties may also get involved in others’ conflicts in the service of forming and maintaining valuable social alliances. Here, the accuracy of the information is less of an issue. Even if it’s true that person B is an unsavory character, he may also be a useful person to have as an ally (or at least, not have as enemy; as the now famous quote goes, more or less: “He might be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch”). As I touched on previously the accuracy of our perceptions are only relevant to the extent that accuracy leads to useful outcomes; accuracy for its own sake is not something that could be selected for. This suggests that we shouldn’t expect our evaluations of victimhood claims to be objective or consistent; we should expect them to be useful and strategic. Our moral templates shouldn’t be automatically completed in all cases, as our visual templates are for the Kanizsa Triangle; in fact, we should expect inputs to often be erased from our moral templates – something of an automatic removal.

Let’s now return to the banker’s paradox. In the moral realm, our investments come with higher stakes than they do in the friendship realm. To side with one party in a moral judgment is not to simply invest your time in one person over another; it involves actively harming other potential investment partners, potentially alienating them directly and their allies indirectly (and harming them can bring with it associated retribution). That said, aligning yourself with someone making a moral claim can bring huge benefits, in the form of reciprocal social support and building alliances. As Tooby and Cosmides put it:

…[I]f you are unusually or uniquely valuable to someone else – for whatever reason – then that person has an uncommonly strong interest in your survival during times of difficulty. The interest they have in your survival makes them, therefore, highly valuable to you. (p.140)

So the question remains: In the context of claims to victimhood, how does someone make themselves appear valuable to others, in order to recruit their support?

Please say the answer involves trips to the red light district…

There are two distinct ways of doing this which come to mind: making yourself look like a better investment, and/or make others appear to be a worse investment. Victims face a tricky dilemma in regard to the first item: they need to make themselves appear to genuinely have been a victim while not making themselves look too easily victimizable. To make oneself look to victimizable is to make oneself look like a bad investment; one that will frequently need support and be relatively inept at returning the assistance. Going too far in other direction though, by making oneself out to be relatively unharmable, could have a negative effect on your ability to recruit support as well. This is because, as in the banker’s paradox, rich people don’t really need money, and, accordingly, people in strong positions socially are not generally viewed as needing help either; you rarely find people concerned with the plight of the rich and powerful. Those who don’t need help may not be the most grateful for it, nor the most likely to reciprocate it. Tooby and Cosmides (1996) recognized this issue, writing:

“…[I]f a person’s trouble is temporary or they can easily be returned to a position of full benefit-dispersing competence by feasible amounts of assistance…then personal troubles should not make someone a less attractive object of assistance. Indeed, a person who is in this kind of trouble might be a more attractive object of investment than one who is currently safe, because the same delivered investment will be valued more by the person in dire need.” (p.132)

Such a line of reasoning would imply we should expect to find victims trying to manipulate (a) the perceptions others have of their need, (b) their eventual usefulness, and (c) the perceptions others have concerning the needs and usefulness of the perpetrator. Likewise, perpetrators should be engaging counter manipulation along precisely the same dimensions. We would also expect that victims and perpetrators might try and sway the cost/benefit analysis in third parties via the use of warnings and threats – implicit or explicit – about the consequences of siding with one party or another. Remember, third parties are not making these judgments in a vacuum; if the majority of third parties side with person A, third parties that sided with person B might now find themselves on the receiving end of social sanctions or ostracism.

DeScioli & Kurzban (2012), realizing this issue, posit that human mind contains adaptions for coordinating which side to take in a dispute with other third parties, so as to avoid the costs of potential despotism on the one hand, and the costs of inter-alliance fighting on the other. If a publicly observable signal not tied to one’s individual identity is used for coordinating third party involvement – i.e. all third parties will align together against an actor for doing X (killing, lying, saying the wrong thing, etc), no matter who does it – third parties can solve the problem of discoordination with one another. However, one notable problem with this approach is the informational hurdle I mentioned previously: most people are not witnesses to the vast majority of acts people engage in. Now, if person A suggests that person B has done something morally wrong, and person B denies it, provided the two are the only witnesses to the act, there’s not a whole lot to go on in terms of publicly observable signals. Without such signals (and even with them), the mind needs to use whatever available information it has to make such a judgment, and that information largely revolves around the identity of the actors in question.

And some people just aren’t very good actors.

I’d like to return briefly to a finding I’ve discussed before: men and women agree that women tend to be more discriminated against than men, even in the face of contradictory evidence. This finding might arise because people are perceiving – accurately – that women tend to be objectively more victimized. It might also arise because certain classes of people – in this case, women, relative to men – are viewed as being better investments of limited social capital. For instance, in terms of future rewards, it might be a good idea for a man to align himself with a woman – or, at the very least, not align himself against her – even in the event she’s guilty; moral condemnation does not tend to get the romance following, from my limited understanding of human interaction.

It would follow, then, that the automatic completion vs automatic deletion threshold for our moral templates should vary, contingent on the actor in question: friends and family have a different threshold than strangers; possible romantic interests have a different threshold than those we find romantically repulsive. Alliances might even serve as potential tipping points for third parties. Let’s say person A and B get involved in a dispute; even if person A is clearly in the wrong, if person A already has a large number of partial backers, the playing field is no longer level for third party involvement. Third party involvement can be driven by a large number of factors, and we shouldn’t expect all moral claims to be viewed equally, even in cases where the underlying logic is the same. The goal is usefulness; not consistency.

References: DeScioli, P., & Kurzban, R. (2012). A Solution to the Mysteries of Morality Psychological Bulletin DOI: 10.1037/a0029065

Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the banker’s paradox:Other pathways to the evolution of adaptations for altruism. Proceedings of the British Academy, 88, 119-143

The Myths That Never Were

Posted on July 7, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

I recently came across a post over at Psychology Today entitled, “Six Myths About Female Sexuality and Why They’re Myths” by one Susan Whitbourne. I feel the need to discuss it here for two reasons: first, it’s a terrible piece; not only does Susan get a lot wrong, she gets it wrong badly while bad-mouthing my field. So that’s kind of annoying, but it’s not the main reason. That reason is because, at the time I’m writing this, there are five comments on the article; there were ten comments on it before I had left mine last time I had checked it. This means at least six comments (all the highly critical ones, I might add) were deleted. This has, in turn, activated my moral template for automatic completion, and I find myself perceiving an incompetent writer trying to hide criticism instead of engaging it, instead of all the negative comments vanishing into the internet magically.

“Just throw a rug over it and you’re good to go”

I’d like to first mention that the source Susan is drawing her information from is Terri Conley. You know, the one who suggested that sexual reproduction is a byproduct of sexual pleasure. That is to say, sexual reproduction did not directly contribute to reproduction, which is kind of an odd claim to make. The paper itself was also discussed at some length here roughly a year ago, so what I’m doing is largely repetition; you know, standing on the shoulders of giants and all. Anyway, on to the matter of figuring out what institution is giving out psychology PhDs to people who clearly don’t deserve them (I’m looking at you…Columbia University? Really? Well, fancy that).

Susan – who I should remind everyone again says she has a PhD – in her first point suggests that men and women value the traits of status, youth, and attractiveness equally. Since this point is about preferences, it’s wrong on the grounds that massive amounts of evidence from surveys the world over demonstrate precisely that pattern of preferences. However, just because someone has certain preferences, it does not imply that their partner – should they eventually have one – will manifest any or all aspects of those preferences, as tradeoffs need to be made. If everyone expressed an interest for an attractive partner and there are only so many attractive partners to go around, someone’s going to be disappointed; many someones, in fact. Accordingly, it might not be such a good idea to attempt and invest a lot of energy in a long-shot, no matter how attractive the payoff might be (but more about speed dating below).

The second “myth” is that men and women desire (and have) different numbers of partners. In the realm of desire, men do indeed desire a greater number of partners than women. However, when, as Susan suggests, “appropriate statistical controls were used”, this difference goes away. In the current context, “appropriate” means “using the median instead of a mean”, or, as I might put it, ignoring all the inconvenient data. This is not a first time that a median, rather than mean, has been used to ignore data that doesn’t fit preconceptions. Now, of course, men and women need to have the same number of opposite sex partners; that’s just basic statistics. Despite this, men tend to claim to have more partners than women, so someone must be lying. In this case, the person lying is… the author, Susan. She reported that when hooked up to a fake lie detector, men adjusted their number down, which is peculiar, given that the study she’s talking about (Alexander & Fisher, 2003) found that men were consistent across groups; it was the women who were under-reporting. Way to bust myths, Susan.

You clearly put in the effort instead of just bullshitting it.

The third myth is that men think about sex more than women. This myth is a myth, according to Susan, in that it’s true. Men do, in fact, think about sex more, according to Conley et al (2011); they also think about food and sleep more. So let’s examine the logic here: Men do X more than women. Men also do Y and Z more than women. Therefore, men don’t do X more. Sure, that might seem like a basic failure of reasoning abilities, since the conclusion in no way follows from the premises, but, bear in mind, this woman does have a PhD from Columbia, so she clearly must understand this problem better than those who pointed out this huge failing. Better to just delete the comments of people pointing this out, rather than risk Susan wasting her valuable time engaging in debate with them.

Myth four is another one of those true myths: women have orgasms less frequently than men. However, it’s not just a true myth; it’s also one of those things Susan lies about. Susan grants that this orgasm differential exists in hookups, but not in romantic relationships. Conley et al (2011) report on data showing that, during hookups, women orgasm 32% and 49% as frequently as men (in first and repeat hookups respectively). However, in established relationships, women orgasmed 80% as much. Thus, according to Susan, a 20% gap in frequency amounts to no gap. Frankly, I’m surprised that Mythbusters hasn’t snatched Susan up yet, given her impressive logical and basic reading abilities.

Myth five is that, apparently, men like casual sex more than woman. I know; I was shocked to hear people thought that too. I already linked to the discussion of the article Conley (2011) uses to support the notion that men and women like causal sex just as much, but here it is again. The long and short of the paper is that, when women and men considered casual sex offers from very attractive and famous people, there was no difference. Women were also just as likely as men to accept a casual sex offer from a close friend who they thought would provide a positive sexual experience. It might be worth pointing that most people aren’t very attractive, famous, familiar, and skilled in bed, and women tend to judge most men as lacking in this department (given that 0% accepted offers for casual sex in the classic Clark and Hatfield paper), whereas the same dimensions don’t seem to matter to men nearly as much (given the roughly 75% acceptance rate). It might be worth pointing that out, that is, if you know what you’re talking about, which Susan and Conley clearly don’t.

Finally, we arrive at Myth Six: women are choosier than men. The Clark and Hatfield results, along with evidence from every culture across the globe and many species on the planet, might seem to confirm this myth. However, the results of a single speed-dating survey where no sexual behavior actually took place and no sex difference was fully reversed could overturn it all. In this study, depending on who approached who at a speed-dating event, there was a (relatively minor) effect on feelings of romantic desire, chemistry, and a desire to see the other partner again. That said, women tend to not approach men as much as men approach women in the world outside of the speed-dating scenarios, and when women approached men in the Clark and Hatfield study the men overwhelmingly said “yes” (while the women universally said “no” when approached by a man), and the study didn’t track whether anything ever came of the speed-dating, and a certain type of person might be interested in speed-dating, and speed-dating might not be terribly ecologically valid, and….you get the idea.

But other than being a total failure, your article was a great success.

Susan caps off her article by demonstrating that she doesn’t understand that the nature/nurture debate has long ago ended and that evolutionary psychologists reject such a dichotomy in the first place by asking about whether these behaviors are genetically or environmentally based. It’s nice to see that Susan comes full circle from her introduction where she suggests that she doesn’t understand evolution isn’t working to “keep the species afloat”. Finally, she asked why some people, who ought to know better, favor an evolutionary-based theory in their research. One can only wonder, Susan. I’ll leave it to people like you, who clearly know better, to lead the way. I just hope for all of our sakes that whatever path you end up leading us down doesn’t involve you having to read or understand anything.

References: Alexander MG, & Fisher TD (2003). Truth and consequences: using the bogus pipeline to examine sex differences in self-reported sexuality. Journal of sex research, 40 (1), 27-35 PMID: 12806529

Conley, T.D., Moors, A.C., Matsick, J.L., Ziegler, A., & Valentine, B.A. (2011). Women, Men, and the Bedroom: Methodological and Conceptual Insights That Narrow, Reframe, and Eliminate Gender Differences in Sexuality Psychological Science DOI: 10.1177/0963721411418467

Kanizsa’s Morality

Posted on July 6, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

While we rely on our senses to navigate through life, there are certain quirks about the way our perception works that we often aren’t consciously aware of. It’s only when we encounter illusions, the most well-known of which tend to inhabit the visual domain, that certain inner workings of our perception modules become apparent. Take the following example as a good for instance: the checkerboard illusion. Given the proper context, our visual system is capable perceiving the two squares to be different colors despite the fact that they are the same color. On top of bringing certain facets of our visual modules into stark relief, the illusion demonstrates one other very important fact about our cognition: accuracy need not always be the goal. Our visual systems were only selected to be as good as they needed to be in order for us to do useful things, given the environment we tended to find ourselves in; they were not selected to be perfectly accurate in each and every situation they might find themselves in.

See, Criss Angel? It’s not that hard to do your job.

That endearing little figure is known as Kanizsa’s Triangle. While there is no actual triangle in the figure, some cognitive template is being automatically filled in given inputs from certain modules (probably ones designed for detecting edges and contrast), and the end result is that illusory perception; our mind automatically completes the picture, so to speak. This kind of automatic completion can have its uses, like allowing inferences to be drawn from a limited amount of information relatively quickly. Without such cognitive templates, tasks like learning language – or not walking into things – would be far more difficult, if not downright impossible. While picking up on recurrent and useful patterns of information in the world might lead to a perceptual quirk here and there, especially in highly abnormal and contrived scenarios like the previous two illusions, the occasional misfire is worth the associated gains.

Now let’s suppose that instead of detecting edges and contrasts we’re talking about detecting intentions and harm – the realm of morality. Might there be some input conditions that (to some extent) automatically result in a cognitive moral template being completed? Perhaps the most notable case came from Knobe (2003):

The vice president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits and it will also harm the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about harming the environment, I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.

When asked, in this case most people suggested that the negative outcome was brought about intentionally and the chairman should be punished. When the word “harm” is replaced by help, people’s answers reverse and they now say the chairman wasn’t helping intentionally and deserves no praise.

Further research on the subject by Guglielmo & Malle (2010) found that the “I don’t care at all about…” in the preceding paragraph was indeed viewed differently by people depending on whether or not the person who said it was conforming to or violating a norm. When violating a norm, people tended to perceive some desire for that outcome in the violator, despite the violator stating they don’t care one way or the other; when conforming to a norm, people didn’t perceive that same desire given the same statement of indifference. The violation of a norm, then, might be used as part of an input for automatically filling in some moral template concerning perceptions of the violator’s desires, much like the Kanizsa Triangle. It can cause people to perceive a desire, even if there is none. This finding is very similar to another input condition I recently touched on: the perception of a person’s desires on their blameworthiness contingent on their ability to benefit from others being harmed (even if the person in question didn’t directly or indirectly cause the harm).

“I don’t care at all about the NFL’s dress code!”

A recent paper by Grey et al (PDF here) builds upon this analogy rather explicitly. In it, they point out two important things: first, any moral judgment requires there be a victim and a perpetrator dyad; this represents the basic cognitive template of moral interactions through which all moral judgments can be understood. Second, the authors note that there need not actually be a real perpetrator or a victim for a moral judgment to take place; all that’s required is the perception of this pair.

Let’s return briefly to vision: when it comes to seeing the physical world, it’s better to have an accurate picture of it. This is because you can’t do things like persuade a cliff it’s not actually a cliff, or tell gravity to not pull you down. Thankfully, since the physical environment isn’t trying to persuade us of anything in particular either, accurate pictures of the world are relatively easy to come by. The social world, however, is full of agents that might be (and thus, probably are) misrepresenting information for their own benefit.

Taken together with the work just reviewed, this suggests that the moral template can be automatically completed: people can be led to either perceive victims or perpetrators where there are none (given they already perceive one or the other), or fail perceive victims and perpetrators that actually exist (given that they fail to perceive one or the other). Since accuracy isn’t the goal of these perceptions per se, whether the inputs given to the moral template are erased or cause it to be filled in will likely depend on their context; that is to say people should strategically “see” or “fail to see” victims or perpetrators, quite unlike whether people see the Kanizsa Triangle (they almost universally do). Some of possible reasons why people might fall in one direction or the other will be the topic of the next post.

References: Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B.F. (2010). Can Unintended Side Effects Be Intentional? Resolving a Controversy Over Intentionality and Morality Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin DOI: 10.1177/0146167210386733

Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language Analysis DOI: 10.1093/analys/63.3.190

Assumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent

Posted on June 14, 2012 by Jesse Marczyk

Motley Crue is a band that’s famous for a lot of reasons, their music least of all. Given their reputation, it was a little strange to see them doing what celebrities do best: selling out by endorsing Kia. At least I assume they were selling out. When I first saw the commercial, I doubted that Motley Crue just happened to really love Kia cars and had offered to appear in one of their commercials, letting it feature one of their many songs about overdosing. No; instead, my immediate reaction to the commercial was that Motley Crue probably didn’t care one way or another when it came to Kia, but since the company likely ponied up a boat-load of cash, Motley Crue agreed to, essentially, make a fake and implicit recommendation on the car company’s behalf. (Like Wayne’s World, but without the irony)

What’s curious about that reaction is that I have no way of knowing whether or not it’s correct; I’ve never talked to any of the band members personally, and I have no idea what the terms of that commercial were. Despite this, I feel, quite strongly, that my instincts on the matter were accurate. More curious still, seeing the commercial actually lowered my opinion of the band. I’m going to say a little more about what I think this reaction reflects later, but first I’d like to review a study with some very interesting results (and the usual set of theoretical shortcomings).

I’m not being paid to say it’s interesting, but I’ll scratch that last bit if the price is right.

The paper, by Inbar et al (2012), examined the question of whether intentionality and causality are necessary components when it comes to attributions of blameworthiness. As it turns out, people appear quite willing to (partially) blame others for outcomes that they had no control over – in this case, natural disasters – so long as said others might only have desired it to happen.

In the first of four experiments, the subjects in one condition read about how a man at a large financial firm was investing in “catastrophe bonds”, which would be worth a good deal of money if an earthquake struck a third world country within a two year period. Alternatively, they read about man investing in the same product, except this time the investment would pay out if an earthquake didn’t hit the country. In both cases, the investment ends up paying off. When subjects were asked about how morally wrong such actions are, and how morally blameworthy the investor was, the investor was rated as being more morally wrong and blameworthy in the condition where he benefited from harm, controlling for how much the subjects liked him personally.

The second experiment expanded on this idea. This time, the researchers varied the outcome of the investment: now, the investments didn’t always work out in the investor’s favor. Some of the people who were betting on the bad outcome actually didn’t profit because the good outcome obtained, and vice versa. The question being asked here was whether or not these judgments of moral wrongness and blameworthiness were contingent on profiting from a bad outcome or just being in the position to potentially benefit. As it turns out, actually benefiting wasn’t required: the results showed that the investor simply desiring the harmful outcome (that one didn’t cause, directly or indirectly) was enough to trigger these moral judgments. This pattern of results neatly mirrors judgments of harm – where attempted but failed harm is rated as being just about as bad as the completed and intended variety.

The third experiment sought to examine whether the benefits being contingent on harm – and harm specifically – mattered. In this case, an investor takes out that same catastrophe bond, but there are other investments in place, such that the firm will make the same amount of money whether or not there’s a natural disaster. In other words, now the investor has no specific reason to desire the natural disaster. In this case, subjects now felt the investor wasn’t morally in the wrong or blameworthy. So long as the investor wasn’t seen as wanting the negative outcome specifically, subjects didn’t seem to care about his doing the same thing. It just wasn’t wrong anymore.

“I’ve got some good news and some bad news…no, wait; that bad news is for you. I’m still rich.”

The final experiment in this study looked at whether or not selling that catastrophe bonds off would be morally exculpatory. As it turned out, it was: while the people who bought the bonds in the first place were not judged as nice people, subsequently selling the bonds the next day to pay off an unexpected offense reduced their blameworthiness. It was only when someone was currently in a position to benefit from harm that they were seen as more morally blameworthy.

So how might we put this pattern of results into a functional context?. Inbar et al (2012) note that moral judgments typically involve making a judgment about an actor’s character (or personality, if you prefer). While they don’t spell it out, what I think they’re referring to is the fact that people have to overcome an adaptive hurdle when engaging socially with others: they need to figure out which people in their social world to invest their scarce resources in. In order to successfully deal with this issue, one needs to make some (at least semi-accurate) predictions concerning the likely future behavior of others. If one sends the message that their interests are not your interests – such as by their profiting if you lose – there’s probably a good chance that they aren’t going to benefit you in the long term, at least relative to someone who sends the opposite signal.

However, one other aspect that Inbar et al (2012) don’t deal with brings us back to my feelings about Motley Crue. When deciding whether or not to blame someone, the decision needs to be made, typically, in the absence of absolute certainty regarding guilt. In my case, I made a judgment based on zero information, other than my background assumptions about the likely motives of celebrities and advertisers: I judged the band’s message as disingenuous, suggesting they would happily alter their allegiances if the price was right; they were fair-weather friends, who aren’t the best investments. In another case, let’s say that a dead body turns up, and they’ve clearly been murdered. The only witness to this murder was the killer, and whoever it is doesn’t feel like admitting it. When it comes time for the friends of the deceased to start making accusations, who’s going to seem like a better candidate: a stranger, or the burly fellow the dead person was fighting with recently? Those who desired to harm others tended to, historically, have the ability to translate those desires into actions, and, as such, make good candidates for blame.

“I really just don’t see how he could have been responsible for the recent claw attacks”

Now in the current study there was no way the actor in question could have been the cause of the natural disaster, but our psychology is, most likely, not built for dealing with abstract cases like that. While subjects may report that, no, that man was not directly responsible, some modules that are looking for possible candidates to blame are still hard at work behind the scenes, checking for those malicious desires; considering who would benefit from the act, and so on (“It just so happened that I gained substantially from your loss, which I was hoping for,” doesn’t make the most convincing tale). In much the same way, pornography can still arouse people, even though the porn offers no reliable increase in fitness and “the person” “knows” that. What I feel this study is examining, albeit not explicitly, are the input conditions for certain modules that deal in the uncertain and fuzzy domain of morality.

(As an aside, I can’t help but wonder whether the people in the stories – investment firms and third world countries – helped the researchers find the results they were looking for. It seems likely that some modules dealing with determining plausible perpetrators might tap into some variable like relative power or status in their calcuations, but that’s a post for another day.)

References: Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D., & Cushman, F. (2012). Benefiting From Misfortune: When Harmless Actions Are Judged to Be Morally Blameworthy Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38 (1), 52-62 DOI: 10.1177/0146167211430232

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