The Connection Between Economics and Promiscuity

When it comes to mating, humans are a rather flexible species. In attempting to make sense of this variation, a natural starting point for many researchers is to try and tackle what might be seen as the largest question: why are some people more inclined to promiscuity or monogamy than others? Though many answers can be given to that question, a vital step in building towards a plausible and useful explanation of the variance is to consider the matter of function (as it always is). That is, we want to be asking ourselves the question, “what adaptive problems might be solved by people adopting long- or short-term mating strategies?” By providing answers to this question we can, in turn, develop expectations for what kind of psychological mechanisms exist to help solve these problems, explanations for how they could solve them, and then go examine the data more effectively for evidence of their presence or absence.

It will help until the research process is automated, anyway

The current research I wanted to talk about today begins to answer the question of function by considering (among other things) the matter of resource acquisition. Specifically, women face greater obligate biological costs when it comes to pregnancy than men. Because of this, men tend to be the more eager sex when it comes to mating and are often willing to invest resources to gain favor with potential mates (i.e., men are willing to give up resources for sex). Now, if you’re a woman, receiving this investment is an adaptive benefit, as it can be helpful in ensuring the survival and well-being of both yourself and your offspring. The question then becomes, “how can women most efficiently extract these resources from men?” As far as women are concerned, the best answer – in an ideal world – is to extract the maximum amount of investment from the maximum amount of men.

However, men have their own interests too; while they might be willing to pay-to-play, as it were, the amount they’re willing to give up depends on what they’re getting in return. What men are looking for (metaphorically or literally speaking) is what women have: a guarantee of sharing genes with their offspring. In other words, men are looking for paternity certainty. Having sex with a woman a single time increases the odds of being the father of one of her children, but only by a small amount. As such, men should be expected to prefer extended sexual access over limited access. Paternity confidence can also be reduced if a woman is having sex with one or more other men at the same time. This leads us to expect that men adjust their willingness to invest in women upwards if that investment can help them obtain one or both of those valued outcomes.

This line of reasoning lead the researchers to develop the following hypothesis: as female economic dependence on male investment increases, so too should anti-promiscuity moralization. That is, men and women should both increase their moral condemnation of short-term sex when male investment is more valuable to women. For women, this expectation arises because promiscuity threatens paternity confidence, and so their engaging in mating with multiple males should make it more difficult for them to obtain substantial male investment. Moreover, other women engaging in short-term sex similarly makes it more difficult for even monogamous women to demand male investment, and so would be condemned for their behavior as well. Conversely, since men value paternity certainty, they too should condemn promiscuity to a greater degree when their investment is more valuable, as they are effectively in a better position to bargain for what they want.

In sum, the expectation in the present study was that as female economic dependence increases, men and women should become more opposed to promiscuous mating.

“Wanted: Looking for paternity certainty. Will pay in cash”

This was tested in two different ways: in the first study, 656 US residents answered questions about their perceptions of female economic dependence on male investment in their social network, as well as their attitudes about promiscuity and promiscuous people. The correlation between the measures ended up being r = .28, which is a good proof of concept, though not a tremendous relationship (which is perhaps to be expected, given that multiple factors likely impact attitudes towards promiscuity). When economic dependence was placed into a regression to predict this sexual moralization, controlling for age, sex, religiosity, and conservatism in the first step, it was found that female economic dependence accounted for approximately 2% of the remaining variance in the wrongness of promiscuity ratings. That’s not nothing, to be sure, but it’s not terribly substantial either.

In the second study, 4,626 participants from across the country answered these same basic questions, along with additional questions, like their (and their partner’s) personal income. Again, there was a small correlation (r = .23) between female economic dependence and wrongness of promiscuity judgments. Also again, when entered into a regression, as before, an additional 2% of the variance in these wrongness judgments was predicted by economic dependence measures. However, this effect became more substantial when the analysis was conducted at the level of the states, rather than at the level of individuals. At the state level, the correlation between female economic dependence and attitudes towards promiscuity now rose to r = .66, with the dependence measure predicting 9% of the variance of promiscuity judgments in the regression with the other control factors.

Worth noting is that, though a women’s personal income was modestly predictive of her attitudes towards promiscuity, it was not as good of a predictor as her perception of the dependence of women she knows. There are two ways to explain this, though they are not mutually exclusive: first, it’s possible that women are adjusting their attitudes so as to avoid condemnation of others. If lots of women rely on this kind of investment, then she could be punished for being promiscuous even if it was in her personal interests. As such, she adopts anti-promiscuity attitudes as a way of avoiding punishment preemptively. The second explanation is that, given our social nature, our allies are important to us, and adjusting our moral attitudes so as to gain and maintain social support is also a viable strategy. It’s something of the other side of the same social support coin, and so both explanations can work together.

The dual-purpose marriage/friendship ring

Finally, I wanted to discuss a theoretical contradiction I find myself struggling to reconcile. Specifically, in the beginning of the paper, the authors mention that females will sometimes engage in promiscuous behavior in the service of obtaining resources from multiple males. A common example of this kind of behavior is prostitution, where a woman will engage in short-term intercourse with men in explicit exchange for money, though the strategy need not be that explicit or extreme. Rather than obtaining lots of investment from a single male, then, a viable female strategy should be to obtain several smaller investments from multiple males. Following this line of reasoning, then, we might end up predicting that female economic dependence on males might increase promiscuity and, accordingly, lower moral condemnation of it, at least in some scenarios.

If that were the case, the pattern of evidence we might predict is that, when female economic dependence is high, we should see attitudes towards promiscuity become more bi-modal, with some women more strongly disapproving of it while others become more strongly approving. As such, looking at the mean impact of these economic factors might be something of a wash (as they kind of were on the individual level). Instead, one might be interested in looking at the deviations from the mean instead, and see if those areas in which female economic dependence is the greatest show a larger standard deviation from the average moralization value than those in areas of lower dependence. Perhaps there are some theoretical reasons that this is implausible, but none are laid out in the paper.

References: Price, M., Pound, N., & Scott, I. (2014). Female economic dependence and the morality of promiscuity. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 43, 1289-1301.

Why Non-Violent Protests Work

It’s a classic saying: The pen is mightier than the sword. While this saying communicates some valuable information, it needs to be qualified in a significant way to be true. Specifically, in a one-on-one fight, the metaphorical pens do not beat swords. Indeed, as another classic saying goes: Don’t bring a knife to a gun fight. If knives aren’t advisable against guns, then pens are probably even less advisable. This raises the question as to how – and why – pens can triumph over swords in conflicts. These questions are particularly relevant, given some recent happenings in California at Berkeley where a protest against a speaking engagement by Milo Yiannopoulos took a turn for the violent. While those who initiated the violence might not have been students of the school, and while many people who were protesting might not engage in such violence themselves when the opportunity arises, there does appear to be a sentiment among some people who dislike Milo (like those leaving comments over on the Huffington Post piece) that such violence is to be expected, is understandable, and sometimes even morally justified or praiseworthy. The Berkeley riot was not the only such incident lately, either.

The Nazis shooting guns is a very important detail here

So let’s discuss why such violent behavior is often counterproductive for the swords in achieving their goals. Non-violent political movements, like those associated with leaders like Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi, appear to yield results, at least according to the only bit of data on the matter I’ve come across (for the link-shy: nonviolent campaigns combined complete and partial success rate was about 73%, while the comparable violent rate was about 33%). I even came across a documentary recently I intend to watch about a black man who purportedly got over 200 members of the KKK to leave the organization without force or the threat of it; he simply talked to them. That these nonviolent methods work at all seems rather unusual, at least if you were to frame it in terms of any other nonhuman species. Imagine, for instance, that a chimpanzee doesn’t like how he is being treated by the resident dominant male (who is physically aggressive), and so attempts to dissuade that individual from his behavior by nonviolently confronting him. No matter how many times the dominant male struck him, the protesting chimp would remain steadfastly nonviolent until he won over the other chimps in his group, and they all turned against the dominant male (or until the dominant male saw the error of his ways). As this would likely not work out for our nonviolent chimp, hopefully nonviolent protests are sounding a little stranger to you now; yet they often seem to work better than violence, at least for humans. We want to know why.

The answer to that question involves turning our attention back to the foundation of our moral sense: why do we perceive a dimension of right and wrong in the world in the first place? The short answer to this question, I think, is that when a dispute arises, those involved in the dispute find themselves in a state of transient need for social support (since numbers can decide the outcome of the conflict). Third parties (those not initially involved in the dispute) can increase their value as a social asset to one of the disputants by filling that need and assisting them in the fight against the rival. This allows third parties to leverage the transient needs of the disputants to build future alliances or defend existing allies. However, not all behaviors generate the same degree of need: the theft of $10 generates less need than a physical assault. Accordingly, our moral psychology represents a cognitive mechanism for determining what degree of need tends to be generated by behaviors in the interests of guiding where one’s support can best be invested (you can find the longer answer here). That’s not to say our moral sense will be the only input for deciding what side we eventually take – factors like kinship and interaction history matter too – but it’s an important part of the decision.

The applications of this idea to nonviolent protest ought to be fairly apparent: when property is destroyed, people are attacked, and the ability of regular citizens to go about their lives is disrupted by violent protests, this generates a need for social support on the part of those targeted or affected by the violence. It also generates worries in those who feel they might be targeted by similar groups in the future. So, while the protesters might be rioting because they feel they have important needs that aren’t being met (seeking to achieve them via violence, or the threat of it), third parties might come to view the damage inflicted by the protest as being more important or harmful (as they generate a larger, or more legitimate need). The net result of that violence is now that third parties side against the protesters, rather than with them. By contrast, a nonviolent protest does not create as large a need on the part of those it targets; it doesn’t destroy property or harm people. If the protesters have needs they want to see met and they aren’t inflicting costs on others, this can yield more support for the protester’s side.

I’m sure the owner of that car really had this coming…

This brings us to our third classic saying of the post: While I disagree with what you have to say, I will defend to the death your right to say it. Though such a sentiment might be seldom expressed these days, it highlights another important point: even if third parties agree with the grievances of the protesters (or, in this case, disagree with the behavior of the people being protested), the protesters can make themselves seem like suitably poor social assets by inflicting inappropriately-large costs (as disagreeing with someone generates less harm than stifling their speech through violence). Violence can alienate existing social support (since they don’t want to have to defend you from future revenge, as people who pick fights tend to initiate and perpetuate conflicts, rather than end them) and make enemies of allies (as the opposition now offers a better target of social investment, given their relative need). The answer as to why pens can beat swords, then, is not that pens are actually mightier (i.e., capable of inflicting greater costs), but rather that pens tend to be better at recruiting other swords to do their fighting for them (or, in more mild cases, pens can remove the social support from the swords, making them less dangerous). The pen doesn’t actually beat the sword; it’s the two or more swords the pen has persuaded to fight for it – and not the opposing sword – that do.

Appreciating the power of social support helps bolster our understanding of other possible interactions between pens and swords. For instance, when groups are small, swords will likely tend to be more powerful than pens, as large numbers of third parties aren’t around to be persuaded. This is why our nonviolent chimp example didn’t work well: chimps don’t reliably join disputes as third parties on the basis of behavior the way humans do. Without that third-party support, non-violence will fail. The corollary point here is that pens might find themselves in a bit of a bind when it comes to confrontations with other pens. Put in plain terms: nonviolence is a useful rallying cry for drawing social support if the other side of the dispute is being violent. If both sides abstain from violence, however, nonviolence per se no longer persuades people. You can’t convince someone to join your side in a dispute by pointing out something your side shares with the other. This should result in the expectation that people will frequently over-represent the violence of the opposition, perhaps even fabricating it completely, in the interests of persuading others. 

Yet another point that can be drawn from this analysis is that even “bad” ideas or groups (whether labeled as such because of moral or factual reasons) can recruit swords to their side if they are targeted by violence. Returning to the cases we began with – the riot at UC Berkeley and the incident where Richard Spencer got punched – if you hope to exterminate people who hold disagreeable views, then violence might seem like the answer. However, as we have seen, violence against others, even disagreeable others, who are not themselves behaving violently can rally support from third parties, as they might begin to worry that threats to free speech (or other important issues) are more harmful than the opinions and words we find disagreeable (again, hitting someone creates more need than talking does). On the other hand, if you hope to persuade people to join your side (or at least not join the opposition), you will need to engage with arguments and reasoning. Importantly, you need to treat those you hope to persuade as people and engage with the ideas and values they actually hold. If the goal in these disputes really is to make allies, you need to convince others that you have their best interests at heart. Calling those who disagree “baskets of deplorables,” suggesting they’re too stupid to understand the world, or anything to that extent doesn’t tend to win their hearts and minds. If anything, it sends a signal to them that you do not value them, giving them all the more reason to not spend their time helping you achieve your goals.  

“Huh; I guess I really am a moron and you’re right. Well done,” said no one, ever.

As a final matter, we could also discuss the idea that violence is useful at snuffing out threats preemptively. In other words, better to stop someone before they can try and attack you, rather than after their knife is already in your back. There are several reasons preemptive defense is just as suspect, so let’s run through a few: first, there are different legal penalties for acts like murder and attempted murder, as attempted – but incomplete acts – generate less needs than completed ones. As such, they garner less social support. Second, absent very strong evidence that the people targeted for violence would have eventually become violent, the preemptive attacks will not look defensive; they will simply look aggressive, returning to the initial problems violent protests face. Relatedly, it is unlikely to ever make allies of enemies; if anything, it will make deeper enemies of existing ones and their allies. Remember: when you hurt someone, you indirectly inflict costs on their friends, families, and other relations as well. Finally, some people will likely develop reasonable concerns about the probability of being attacked for holding other opinions or engaging in behaviors people find unpleasant or dangerous. With speech already being equated to violence among certain groups, this concern doesn’t seem unfounded. 

In the interests of persuading others – actors and third parties alike – nonviolence is usually the better first step. However, nonviolence alone is not enough, especially if your opposition is nonviolent as well. Not being violent does not mean you’ve already won the dispute; just that you haven’t lost it. It is at that point you need to persuade others that your needs are legitimate, your demands reasonable, and your position in their interests as well, all while your opposition attempts to be persuasive themselves. It’s not an easy task, to be sure, and it’s one many of us are worse at then we’d like to think; it’s just the best way forward.

The Adaptive Significance Of Priming

One of the more common words you’ll come across in the psychological literature is priming, which is defined as an instance where exposure to one stimulus influences the reaction to a subsequent one. There are plenty of examples one might think of to demonstrate this effect, one of which might be if you were to ask participants to tell you whether a string of letters they see pop up on a screen is a word or a non-word. They would be quicker to respond to the word “nurse” if it were preceded by the prime of “doctor” relative to being preceded by “chair,” owing to the relative association (or lack thereof) between the words. While a great deal of psychological literature deals with priming, very few papers I have come across actually attempt to give some kind of adaptive, functional account of what priming is and, accordingly, why they should expect it to behave the way it does. Because of that absence of theoretical grounding, some research that utilizes priming ends up generating some hypotheses that aren’t just strange; they’re biologically implausible. 

Pictured: Something strange, but at least biological plausible

To give a more concrete sense of what I mean, I wanted to briefly summarize some of that peculiar research using priming that I’ve covered before. In this case, the research either focuses on how priming can affect perceptions about the world or how priming can affect people’s behavior. These lines of inquiry often seem to try and demonstrate how people are biased, inaccurate, or otherwise easily manipulated by seemingly-minor environmental influences. To see what I mean, let’s consider some research findings on both fronts. In terms of perceptions about the world, a few findings are highlighted in this piece, including the prospect that holding a warm drink (instead of a cold one) can lead you judge other people as more caring and generous; a finding that falls under the umbrella of embodied cognition. Why would such a finding arise? If I understand correctly, the line of thought is that holding a warm drink activates some part of your brain that holds the concept “warm”; as that concept is tied indirectly to personality (e.g., “He’s a really warm and friendly person”), you end up thinking the person is nicer than you otherwise would. Warm drinks prime the concept of emotional warmth.

It doesn’t take much thinking about this explanation to see why it seems wrong: a mind structured in such a way would be making a mistake about the world. Specifically, because holding a warm object in your hand should have no effect on the personality and behavior of someone else, if you use that temperature information to influence your judgments, you will be more likely to misjudge the probable intentions of others. If you’re not nice, but I think you are (or at least you’re not as nice as I think you are), I will behave in sub-optimal ways, perhaps by putting more trust in you than I should or generating other expectations of you that won’t be fulfilled. Because there are real costs to being wrong about others – as it opens you up to risks of exploitation, for instance – a cognitive system wired this way should be outperformed by one which ignores more irrelevant information.

Other such examples of the effects of priming posit something similar, except on a behavioral level instead of a perceptual one. For instance, research on stereotype threat suggests that if you remind women of their gender before a math test (in other words, you’re priming gender), they will tend to perform worse than women who were not primed because the concept of “woman” is related to stereotypes of “being worse at a math.” This should be maladaptive for precisely the same reason that the perceptual variety is: actively making yourself worse at a task than you actually are will tend to carry costs. To the extent this effect ostensibly runs in the opposite direction – a case where someone gets better at a task because of a prime, as is the case in the work on power poses – one would wonder why an individual should wait for a prime rather than just get on with the task at hand. Now sure, these effects don’t replicate well and probably aren’t real (see stereotype threat, power poses, and elderly prime effects on walking speed), but that they would even be proposed in the first place is indicative of a problem in the way people think about psychology. They seem like ideas that couldn’t even possibly be correct, given what they would imply about the probable fitness costs to their bearers. Positing maladaptive psychological mechanisms seems rather perverse.

Now I suspect some might object at this point and remind me that not everything our brains do is adaptive. In fact, priming might simply just be an occasionally maladaptive byproduct of activating certain portions of our brain by proximity. This is referred to as spreading activation and it might just be an unfortunate byproduct of brain wiring. “Sure,” you might say, “this kind of spreading activation isn’t adaptive, but it’s just a function of how the brain gets wired up. Our brains can’t help it.” Well, as it turns out, it seems they certainly can.

“Don’t give me that look; you knew better!”

This brings me to some research on memory and priming by Klein et al (2002). These researchers begin with their adaptive framework for priming, suggesting that priming reflects a feature of our cognitive systems – rather than a byproduct – that helps speed up the delivery of appropriate information. In short, priming represents something of a search engine that uses one’s present state to try and predict what information will be needed in the near future. It is crucial to emphasize the word “appropriate” in that hypothesis: the benefits to accessing information stored in our memories, for instance, is to help guide our current behavior. As there many more ways of guiding your behavior towards some maladaptive end, rather than an adaptive one, information stored in memory needs to be accessed selectively. If you spend too much time accessing irrelevant or distracting information, the function of the priming itself – to deliver relevant information quickly – would be thwarted. To put that into a simple example, if you’re trying to quickly solve a problem related to whether you should trust someone, accessing information about what you had for breakfast that morning will not only fail to help you, but it will actively slow your completion of the task down. You’d be wasting time processing irrelevant information.

To demonstrate this point, Klein et al (2002) decided to look at trait judgments: essentially asking people a question like, “how well does the word ‘kind’ describe [you/someone else]?” Without going into too much detail on the matter, our brains seem to store information relevant to these tasks in two different formats: in a summary form and an episodic form. This means one memory system contains information about particular behavioral instances (e.g., a time someone was kind or mean) while another derives summaries of that behavior (e.g., that person, overall, is kind or mean). Broadly speaking, these different memory systems exist owing to a cognitive trade-off between speed and accuracy in judgments: if you want to know how to behave towards someone, it’s quicker to consult the summary information than process every individual memory of their behaviors. However, the summary information tends to be less complete and accurate than the sum of the individual memories. That is, knowing that someone is “often nice” doesn’t give you insight into the conditions during which they are mean. 

As such, if someone was trying to make a judgment about whether you were nice, if they have a summary of “often nice,” they don’t need to spend time consulting memories of every nice thing you’ve done; that would be redundant processing. Instead, they would want to selectively consult the information about times you are not nice, as this would help them figure out the boundary conditions of their judgment; when the “often nice” label doesn’t apply. This lead Klein et al (2002) to the following prediction: retrieving a trait summary of a person should prime trait-inconsistent episodes from memory, rather than trait-consistent ones. In short, priming effects ought to be functionally specific.

“The cat is usually friendly, except for those times you shaved him”

And that is exactly what they found: when participants were asked to judge whether a trait described them (or their mother), they were quicker to subsequently recall a time they (or their mother) behaved in an inconsistent manner. To put that in context, if participants were asked whether the word “polite” described them, they would be quicker to recall a specific instance they were rude, relative to a time they were polite. Moreover, just being asking to define the terms (e.g., rude or polite) didn’t appear to prime trait-consistent episodes in memory either: participants were not quicker to recall a time they were polite after having defined the term. This would be a function of the fact that defining a term does not require you to make a trait judgment about it, so episodic memories wouldn’t be relevant information.

These results are important because if priming were truly just a byproduct of spreading neural activation, then trait-judgments (Are you kind?) should prime trait-consistent episodes (a time you were kind); they just don’t seem to do that. As such, we could conclude that priming does not appear to just be a byproduct of neural activation. If priming isn’t just a biological necessity, then, studies which make use of this paradigm would have to better justify their expectations. If it’s not justifiable to expect indiscriminate neural activation, researchers would need to put in more time to explain and understand the particular patterns of priming they find. Ideally they would do this advance of conducting the research (as Klein et al did), as that would likely save people a lot of time publishing papers on priming that subsequently fail to replicate.  

References: Klein, S., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., & Chance, S. (2002). Decisions and the evolution of memory: multiple systems, multiple functions. Psychological Review, 109, 306-329.

Overperception Of Sexual Interest Or Overeager Researchers?

Though I don’t make a habit of watching many shows, I do often catch some funny clips of them that have been posted online. One that I saw semi-recently (which I feel relates to the present post) is a clip from Portlandia. In this video, people are writing a magazine issue about a man living a life that embodies manhood. In this case, they select a man who used to work at an office, but then left his job and now makes furniture. While everyone is really impressed with the idea, it eventually turns out that the man in question does make furniture…but it’s terrible. Faced with the revelation that the man’s work isn’t good – that it probably wasn’t worth leaving his job to do something he’s bad at – the people in question aren’t impressed by his over-confidence in pursuing his furniture work. They don’t seem to find him more attractive because he was overconfident; quite the opposite in fact. The key determent of his attractiveness was the actual quality of his work. In other words, since he couldn’t back up his confidence with his efforts, the ratings of his attractiveness appeared to drop precipitously.

It might not be comfortable, but at least it’s hand-made

What we can learn from an example like this is that something like overconfidence per se – being more confident than one should be and behaving in ways one rightfully shouldn’t because of it – doesn’t appear to be impressive to potential mates. As such, we might expect that people who pursue activities they aren’t well suited for tend to do worse in the mating domain than those who are able to exist within a niche they more suitably fill: if you can’t cut it as a craftsman, better to keep that steady, yet less-interesting office job. This is largely a factor of the overconfident investing their time and effort into pursuits that do not yield positive benefits for them or others. You can think of it like playing the lottery, in a sense: if you are overly-confident that you’ll win the lottery, you might incorrectly invest money into lottery tickets that you could otherwise spend on pursuits that don’t amount to lighting it on fire.

This is likely why the research on the (over)perception of sexual intent turns out the way it does. I’ve written about the topic before, but to give you a quick overview of the main points: researchers have uncovered that men tend to perceive more sexual interest in women than women themselves report having. To put that in a simple example, if you were to ask a woman, “given you were holding a man’s hand, how sexually interested in him are you?” you’ll tend to get a different answer than if you ask a man, “given that a woman was holding your hand, how sexually interested do you think she is in you?” In particular, men tend to think behaviors like hand-holding signal more sexual intent than women report. These kinds of results have been chalked up to men overperceiving sexual intent, but more recent research puts a different spin on the answers: specifically, if you were to ask a woman, “given that another woman (who is not you) is holding a man’s hand, how sexually interested in him do you think she is?” the answers from the women now align with those of the men. Women (as well as men) seem to believe that other women will underreport their sexual intent, while believing their own self-reports are accurate. Taken together, then, both men and women seem to perceive more sexual intent in a woman’s behavior than the woman herself reports. Rather than everyone else overperceiving sexual intent, it seems a bit more probable that women themselves tend to underreport their own sexual intent. In a sentence, women might play a little coy, rather than everyone else in the world being wrong about them.

Today, I wanted to talk about a very recent paper (Murray et al, 2017) by some of the researchers who seem to favor the overperception hypothesis. That is, they seem to suggest that women honestly and accurately report their own sexual interest, but everyone else happens to perceive it incorrectly. In particular, their paper represents an attempt to respond to the point that women overperceive the sexual intent of other women as well. At the outset, I will say that I find the title of their research rather peculiar and their interpretation of the data rather strange (points I’ll get to below). Indeed, I found both things so strange that I had to ask around a little first before I stared writing this post to ensure that I wasn’t misreading something, as I know smart people wrote the paper in question and the issues seemed rather glaring to me (and if a number of smart people seem to be mistaken, I wanted to make sure the error wasn’t simply something on my end first). So let’s get into what was done in the paper and why I think there are some big issues.

“…Am I sure I’m not the crazy one here, because this seems real strange”

Starting out with what was done, Murray et al (2017) collected data from 414 heterosexual women online. These women answered questions about 15 different behaviors which might signal romantic interest. They were first asked these questions about themselves, and then about other women. So, for instance, a woman might be asked, “If you held hands with a man, how likely is it you intend to have sex with him?” They would then be asked the same hand-holding question, but about other women: “If a woman (who is not you) held hands with a man, how likely is it that she would…” and then end with something along the lines of, “say she wants to have sex with him,” or “actually want to have a sex with him.” They were trying to tap this difference between the perceptions of “what women will say” and “what women actually want” responses. They also wanted to see what happened when you ask the “say” or “want” question first.

Crucially, the previous research these authors are responding to found that both men and women tend to report that, in general, women tend to want more than they say. The present research was only looking at women, but it found that same pattern: regardless of whether you ask the “say” or “want” questions first, women seem to think that other women will say they are less interested than they actually are. In short, women believe other women to be at least somewhat coy. In that sense, these results are a direct replication of the previous findings.

One of the things I find strange about the paper, then, is the title: “A Preregistered Study of Competing Predictions Suggests That Men Do Overestimate Women’s Sexual Intent.” Since this study was only looking at women, the use of “men” in the title seems poorly thought out. I assume the intentions of the authors were to say that these results are consistent with the idea that men also overperceive, but even in that case it really ought to say “People Overestimate,” rather than “Men Do.” I earnestly can’t think of a reason to single out the male gender in the title other than the possibility that the authors seem to have forgotten they were measuring something other than what they actually wanted to. That is, they wanted their results to speak to the idea that male perceptions are biased upwards (in order support their own, prior work), but they seem to be a bit overeager to do so and jumped the gun.

“Well women are basically men anyway, right? Close enough”

Another point I find rather curious from the paper – some data the authors highlight – is that the women’s responses did depend (somewhat) on whether you ask the “say” or “want” questions first. Specifically, the responses to both the “say” and “want” scales are a little lower when the “want” question is asked first. However, the relative pattern of the data – the effect of perceived coyness – exists regardless of the order. I’ve attached a slightly-modified version of their graph below so you can see what their results look like.

What this suggests to me is that something of an anchoring effect exists, whereby the question order might affect how people interpret the values on the scale of sexual intent (which goes from 1 to 7). What it does not suggest to me is what Murray et al (2017) claim it does:

These results support the hypothesis that women’s differential responses to the “say” and “want” questions in Perilloux and Kurzban’s study were driven by question-order effects and language conventions, rather than by women’s chronic underreporting of their sexual intentions.”

As far as I can tell, they do nothing of the sort. Their results – to reiterate – are effectively direct replications of what Perilloux & Kurzban found. Regardless of the order in which you ask the questions, women believed other women wanted more than they would let on. How that is supposed to imply that the previously (and presently) observed effects are due to questioning ordering are beyond me. To convince me this was simply an order effect, data would need to be presented that either (a) showed the effect goes away when the order of the questions is changed or (b) showed the effect changes direction when the question order is changed. Since neither of those things happened, I’m hard pressed to see how the results can be chalked up to order effects.

For whatever reason, Murray et al (2017) seem to make a strange contrast on that front:

We predicted that responses to the “say” and “want” questions would be equivalent when they were asked first, whereas Perilloux and Kurzban confirmed their prediction that ratings for the “want” question would be higher than ratings for the “say” question regardless of the order of the questions”

Rather than being competing hypotheses, these two seem like hypotheses that could both be true: you could see that people interpret the values on the scales differently, depending on which question you ask first while also predicting that the ratings for “want” questions will be higher than those for “say” questions, regardless of the order. Basically, I have no idea why the word “whereas” was inserted into that passage, as if to suggest both of those things could not be true (or false) at the same time (I also have no idea why the word “competing” was inserted into the title of their paper, as it seems equally inappropriate there as the word “men”). Both of those hypotheses clearly can both be true and, indeed, seem to be if these results are taken at face value.

“They predict this dress contains the color black, whereas we predict it contains white”

To sum up, the present research by Murray et al (2017) doesn’t seem to suggest that women (and, even though they didn’t look at them in this particular study, men) overperceive other women’s sexual intentions. If anything, it suggests the opposite. Indeed, as their supplementary file points out, “…across both experimental conditions women reported their own sexual intentions to be significantly lower than both what other women say and what they actually want,” and, “…it seems that when reporting on their own behavior, the most common responses for acting either less or more interested are either never engaging in this behavior or sometimes doing so, whereas women seem to believe that other women most commonly engage in both behaviors some of the time.”

So, not only do women believe that other women (who aren’t them) engage in this coy behavior more often than they themselves do (which would be impossible, as not everyone can think that about everyone else and be right), but women also even admit to, at least sometimes, acting less interested than they actually are. When women are actually reporting that, “Yes, I have sometimes underreported my sexual interest,” well, that seems to make the underreporting hypothesis sound a bit more plausible. The underreporting hypothesis would also be consistent with the data that finds women tend to underreport their number of sexual partners when they think others might see that report or lies will not be discovered; by contrast, male reports of partner numbers are more consistent (Alexander & Fisher, 2003).

Perhaps the great irony here, then, is the Murray et al (2017) might have been a little overeager to interpret their results in a certain fashion, and so end up misinterpreting their study as speaking to men (when it only looks at women) and their hypothesis as being a competing one (when it is not). There are costs to being overeager, just as there are costs to being overconfident; better to stick with appropriate eagerness or confidence to avoid those pitfalls. 

References: Alexander MG, & Fisher TD (2003). Truth and consequences: using the bogus pipeline to examine sex differences in self-reported sexuality. Journal of sex research, 40 (1), 27-35

Murray, D., Murphy, S., von Hippel, W., Trivers, R., & Haselton, M. (2017). A preregistered study of competing predictions suggests that men do overestimate women’s sexual intent. Psychological Science. 

 

Intergenerational Epigenetics And You

Today I wanted to cover a theoretical matter I’ve discussed before but apparently not on this site: the idea of epigenetic intergenerational transmission. In brief, epigenetics refers to chemical markers attached to your DNA that regulate how it’s expressed and regulated without changing the DNA itself. You could imagine your DNA as a book full of information and each cell in your body contains the same book. However, not every cell expressed the full genome; each cell only expresses part of it (which is why skin cells are different from muscle cells, for instance). The epigenetic portion, then, could be thought of as black tape placed over certain passages in the books so they are not read. As this tape is added or removed by environmental influences, different portions of the DNA will become active. From what I understand about how this works (which is admittedly very little at this juncture), usually these markers are not passed onto offspring from parents. The life experiences of your parents, in other words, will not be passed onto you via epigenetics. However, there has been some talk lately of people hypothesizing that not only are these changes occasionally (perhaps regularly?) passed on from parents to offspring; the implication seems to be present that they also might be passed on in an adaptive fashion. In short, organisms might adapt to their environment not just through genetic factors, but also through epigenetic ones.  

Who would have guessed Lamarckian evolution was still alive?

One of the examples given in the target article on the subject concerns periods of feast and famine. While rare in most first-world nations these days, these events probably used to be more recurrent features of our evolutionary history. The example there involves the following context: during some years in early 1900 Sweden food was abundant, while during other years it was scarce. Boys who were hitting puberty just at the time of a feast season tended to have grandchildren who died six years earlier than the grandchildren of boys who have experienced famine season during the same developmental window. The causes of death, we are told, often involving diabetes. Another case involves the children of smokers: men who smoked right before puberty tended to have children who were fatter, on average, than fathers who smoked habitually but didn’t start until after puberty . The speculation, in this case, is that development was in some way affected in a permanent fashion by food availability (or smoking) during a critical window of development, and those developmental changes were passed onto their sons and the sons of their sons.

As I read about these examples, there were a few things that stuck out to me as rather strange. First, it seems odd that no mention was made of daughters or granddaughters in that case, whereas in the food example there wasn’t any mention of the in-between male generation (they only mentioned grandfathers and grandsons there; not fathers). Perhaps there’s more to the data that is let on there but – in the event that no effects were found for fathers or daughters or any kind – it is also possible that a single data set might have been sliced up into a number of different pieces until the researchers found something worth talking about (e.g., didn’t find an effect in general? Try breaking the data down by gender and testing again). Now that might or might not be the case here, but as we’ve learned from the replication troubles in psychology, one way of increasing your false-positive rate is to divide your sample into a number of different subgroups. For the sake of this post, I’m going to assume that is not the case and treat the data as representing something real, rather than a statistical fluke.   

Assuming this isn’t just a false-positive, there are two issues with the examples as I see them. I’m going to focus predominately on the food example to highlight these issues: first, passing on such epigenetic changes seems maladaptive and, second, the story behind it seems implausible. Let’s take the issues in turn.

To understand why this kind of inter-generational epigenetic transmission seems maladaptive, consider two hypothetical children born one year apart (in, say, the years 1900 and 1901). At the time the first child’s father was hitting puberty, there was a temporary famine taking place and food was scarce; at the time of the second child, the famine had passed and food was abundant. According to the logic laid out, we should expect that (a) both children will have their genetic expression altered due to the epigenetic markers passed down by their parents, affecting their long-term development, and (b) the children will, in turn, pass those markers on to their own children, and their children’s children (and so on).

The big Thanksgiving dinner that gave your grandson diabetes

The problems here should become apparent quickly enough. First, let’s begin by assuming these epigenetic changes are adaptive: they are passed on because they are reproductively useful at helping a child develop appropriately. Specifically, a famine or feast at or around the time of puberty would need to be a reliable cue as to the type of environments their children could expect to encounter. If a child is going to face shortages of food, they might want to develop in a different manner than if they’re expecting food to be abundant.

Now that sounds well and good, but in our example these two children were born just a year apart and, as such, should be expected to face (broadly) the same environment, at least with respect to food availability (since feast and famines tends to be more global). Clearly, if the children were adopting different developmental plans in response to that feast of famine, both of them (plan A affected by the famine and plan B not so affected) cannot be adaptive. Specifically, if this epigenetic inheritance is trying to anticipate children’s future conditions by those present around the time of their father’s puberty, at least one of the children’s developmental plans will be anticipating the wrong set of conditions. That said, both developmental plans could be wrong, and conditions could look different than either anticipated. Trying to anticipate the future conditions one will encounter over their lifespan (and over their children’s and grandchild’s lifespan) using only information from the brief window of time around puberty seems like a plan doomed for failure, or at least suboptimal results.

A second problem arises because these changes are hypothesized to be intergenerational: capable of transmission across multiple generations. If that is the case, why on Earth would the researchers in this study pay any mind to the conditions the grandparents were facing around the time of puberty per se? Shouldn’t we be more concerned with the conditions being faced a number of generations backs, rather than the more immediate ones? To phrase this in terms of a chicken/egg problem, shouldn’t the grandparents in question have inherited epigenetic markers of their own from their grandparents, and so on down the line? If that were the case, the conditions they were facing around their puberty would either be irrelevant (because they already inherited such markers from their own parents) or would have altered the epigenetic markers as well.

If we opt for the former possibility, than studying grandparent’s puberty conditions shouldn’t be too impactful. However, if we opt for the latter possibility, we are again left in a bit of a theoretical bind: if the conditions faced by the grandparents altered their epigenetic markers, shouldn’t those same markers also have been altered by the parent’s experiences, and their grandson’s experiences as well? If they are being altered by the environment each generation, then they are poor candidates for intergenerational transmission (just as DNA that was constantly mutating would be). There is our dilemma, then: if epigenetics change across one’s lifespan, they are unlikely candidates for transmission between generations; if epigenetic changes can be passed down across generations stably, why look at the specific period pre-puberty for grandparents? Shouldn’t we be concerned with their grandparents, and so on down the lines?

“Oh no you don’t; you’re not pinning this one all on me”

Now, to be clear, a famine around the time of conception could affect development in other, more mundane ways. If a child isn’t receiving adequate nutrition at the time they are growing, then it is likely certain parts of their developing body will not grow as they otherwise would. When you don’t have enough calories to support your full development, trade-offs need to be made, just like if you don’t have enough money to buy everything you want at the store you have to pass up on some items to afford others. Those kinds of developmental outcomes can certainly have downstream effects on future generations through behavior, but they don’t seem like the kind of changes that could be passed on the way genetic material can. The same can be said about the smoking example provided as well: people who smoked during critical developmental windows could do damage to their own development, which in turn impacts the quality of the offspring they produce, but that’s not like genetic transmission at all. It would be no more surprising than finding out that parents exposed to radioactive waste tend to have children of a different quality than those not so exposed.

To the extent that these intergenerational changes are real and not just statistical oddities, it doesn’t seem likely that they could be adaptive; they would instead likely reflect developmental errors. Basically, the matter comes down to the following question: are the environmental conditions surrounding a particular developmental window good indicators of future conditions to the point you’d want to not only focus your own development around them, but also the development of your children and their children in turn? To me, the answer seems like a resounding, ‘”No, and that seems like a prime example of developmental rigidity, rather than plasticity.” Such a plan would not allow offspring to meet the demands of their unique environments particularly well. I’m not hopeful that this kind of thinking will lead to any revolutions in evolutionary theory, but I’m always willing to be proven wrong if the right data comes up. 

Mistreated Children Misbehaving

None of us are conceived or born as full adults; we all need to grow and develop from single cells to fully-formed adults. Unfortunately – for the sake of development, anyway – the future world you will find yourself in is not always predictable, which makes development a tricky matter at times. While there are often regularities in the broader environment (such as the presence or absence of sunlight, for instance), not every individual will inhabit the same environment or, more precisely, the same place in their environment. Consider two adult males, one of whom is six-feet tall and 230 pounds of muscle, and the other being five-feet tall and 110 pounds. While the dichotomy here is stark, it serves to make a simple point: if both of these males developed in a psychological manner that led them to pursue precisely the same strategies in life – in this case, say, one involving aggressive contests for access to females – it is quite likely that the weaker male will lose out to the stronger one most (if not all) of the time. As such, in order to be more-consistently adaptive, development must be something of a fluid process that helps tailor an individual’s psychology to the unique positions they find themselves in within a particular environment. Thus, if an organism is able to use some cues within their environment to predict their likely place in it in the future (in this case, whether they would grow large or small), their development could be altered to encourage their pursuit of alternate routes to eventual reproductive success. 

Because pretending you’re cut out for that kind of life will only make it worse

Let’s take that initial example and adapt it to a new context: rather than trying to predict whether one will grow up weak or strong, a child is trying to predict the probability of receiving parental investment in the future. If parental investment is unlikely to be forthcoming, children may need to take a different approach to their development to help secure the needed resources on their own, sometimes requiring their undertaking risky behaviors; by contrast, those children who are likely to receive consistent investment might be relatively less-inclined to take such risky and costly matters into their own hands, as the risk vs. reward calculations don’t favor such behavior. Placed in an understandable analogy, a child who estimates they won’t be receiving much investment from their parents might forgo a college education (and, indeed, even much of a high-school one) because they need to work to make ends meet. When you’re concerned about where your next meal is coming from there’s less time in your schedule for studying and taking out loans to not be working for four years. By contrast, the child from a richer family has the luxury of pursuing an education likely to produce greater future rewards because certain obstacles have been removed from their path.

Now obviously going to college is not something that humans have psychological adaptations for – it wasn’t a recurrent feature of our evolutionary history as a species – but there are cognitive systems we might expect to follow different developmental trajectories contingent on such estimations of one’s likely place in the environment; these could include systems judging the relative attractiveness of short- vs long-term rewards, willingness to take risks, pursuit of aggressive resolutions to conflicts, and so on. If the future is uncertain, saving for it makes less than taking a smaller reward in the present; if you lack social or financial support, being willing to fight to defend what little you do have might sound more appealing (as losing that little bit is more impactful when you won’t have anything left). The questions of interest thus becomes, “what cues in the environment might a developing child use to determine what their future will look like?” This brings us to the current paper by Abajobir et al (2016).

One potential cue might be your experiences with maltreatment while growing up, specifically at the hands of your caregivers. Though Abajobir et al (2016) don’t make the argument I’ve been sketching out explicitly, that seems to be the direction their research takes. They seem to reason (implicitly) that parental mistreatment should be a reliable cue to the future conditions you’re liable to encounter and, accordingly, one that children could use to alter their development. For instance, abusive or neglectful parents might lead to children adopting faster life history strategies involving risk-taking, delinquency, and violence themselves (or, if they’re going the maladaptive explanatory route, the failure of parents to provide supporting environments could in some way hinder development from proceeding as it usually would, in a similar fashion to not having enough food growing up might lead to one being shorter as an adult. I don’t know which line the authors would favor from their paper). That said, there is a healthy (and convincing) literature consistent with the hypothesis that parental behavior per se is not the cause of these developmental outcomes (Harris, 2009), but rather that it simply co-occurs with them. Specifically, abusive parents might be genetically different from non-abusive ones and those tendencies could get passed onto the children, accounting for the correlation. Alternatively, parents that maltreat their children might just happen to go together with children having peer groups growing up more prone to violence and delinquency themselves. Both are caused by other third variables.

Your personality usually can’t be blamed on them; you’re you all on your own

Whatever the nature of that correlation, Abajobir et al (2016) sought to use parental maltreatment from ages 0 to 14 as a predictor of later delinquent behaviors in the children by age 21. To do so, they used a prospective cohort of children and their mothers visiting a hospital between 1981-83. The cohort was then tracked for substantiated cases of child maltreatment reported to government agencies up to age 14, and at age 21 the children themselves were surveyed (the mothers being surveyed at several points throughout that time). Out of the 7200 initial participants, 3800 completed the 21-year follow up. At that follow up point, the children were asked questions concerning how often they did things like get excessively drunk, use recreational drugs, break the law, lie, cheat, steal, destroy the property of others, or fail to pay their debts. The mothers were also surveyed on matters concerning their age when they got pregnant, their arrest records, martial stability, and the amount of supervision they gave their children (all of these factors, unsurprisingly, predicting whether or not people continued on in the study for its full duration).

In total, of the 512 eventual cases of reported child maltreatment, only 172 remained in the sample at the 21-year follow up. As one might expect, maternal factors like her education status, arrest record, economic status, and unstable marriages all predicted increased likelihood of eventual child maltreatment. Further, of the 3800 participants, only 161 of them met the criteria for delinquency at 21 years. All of the previous maternal factors predicted delinquency as well: mothers who were arrested, got pregnant earlier, had unstable marriages, less education, and less money tended to produce more delinquent offspring. Adjusting for the maternal factors, however, it was reported that childhood maltreatment still predicted delinquency, but only for the male children. Specifically, maltreatment in males was associated with approximately 2-to-3.5 times as much delinquency as the non-maltreated males. For female offspring, there didn’t seem to be any notable correlation.

Now, as I mentioned, there are some genetic confounds here. It seems probable that parents who maltreat their children are, in some very real sense, different than parents who do not, and those tendencies can be inherited. This also doesn’t necessarily point a causal finger directly at parents, as it is also likely that maltreatment correlates with other social factors, like the peer group a child is liable to have or the neighborhoods they grow up in. The authors also mention that it is possible their measures of delinquency might not capture whatever effects childhood maltreatment (or its correlates) have on females, and that’s the point I wanted to wrap up discussing. To really put these findings on context, we would need to understand what adaptive role these delinquent behaviors – or rather the psychological mechanisms underlying them – have. For instance, frequent recreational drug use and problems fulfilling financial obligations might both signal that the person in question favors short-term rewards over long-term ones; frequent trouble with the law or destroying other people’s property could signal something about how the individual in question competes for social status. Maltreatment does seem to predict (even if it might not cause) different developmental courses, perhaps reflecting an active adjustment of development to deal with local environmental demands.

 The kids at school will all think you’re such a badass for this one

As we reviewed in the initial example, however, the same strategies will not always work equally well for every person. Those who are physically weaker are less likely to successfully enact aggressive strategies, all else being equal, for reasons which should be clear. Accordingly, we might expect that men and women show different patterns of delinquency to the extent they face unique adaptive problems. For instance, we might expect that females who find themselves in particularly hostile environments preferentially seek out male partners capable of enacting and defending against such aggression, as males tend to be more physically formidable (which is not to say that the women themselves might not be more physically aggressive as well). Any hypothetical shifts in mating preferences like these would not be captured by the present research particularly well, but it is nice to see the authors are at least thinking about what sex differences in patterns of delinquency might exist. It would be preferable if they were asking about those differences using this kind of a functional framework from the beginning, as that’s likely to yield more profitable insights and refine what questions get asked, but it’s good to see this kind of work all the same.

References: Abajobir, A., Kisely, S., Williams, G., Strathearnd, L., Clavarino, A., & Najman, J. (2016). Gender differences in delinquency at 21 years following childhood maltreatment: A birth cohort study. Personality & Individual Differences, 106, 95-103. 

Harris, J. (2009). The Nurture Assumption: Why Children Turn Out the Way They Do. Free Press.

If No One Else Is Around, How Attractive Are You?

There’s anecdote that I’ve heard a few times about a man who goes to a diner for a meal. After finishing his dinner the waitress asks him if he’d like some dessert. When he inquires as to what flavors of pie they have the waitress tells him they have apple and cherry. The man says cherry and the waitress leaves to get it. She returns shortly afterwards and tells him she had forgotten they actually also had a blueberry pie. “In that case,” the man replies, “I’ll have apple.” Breaking this story down into a more abstract form, the man was presented with two options: A and B. Since he prefers A to B, he naturally selected A. However, when represented with A, B, and C, he now appears to reverse his initial preference, favoring B over A. Since he appears to prefer both A and B over C, it seems strange that C would affect his judgment at all, yet here it does. Now that’s just a funny little story, but there does appear some psychological literature suggesting that people’s preferences can be modified in similar ways.

“If only I had some more pointless options to help make my choice clear”

The general phenomenon might not be as strange as it initially sounds for two reasons. First, when choosing between A and B, the two items might be rather difficult to directly compare. Both A and B could have some upsides and downsides, but since they don’t necessarily all fall in the same domains, weighing them against the other isn’t always simple. As a for instance, if you looking to buy a new car, one option might have good gas mileage and great interior features (option A) while the other looks more visually appealing and comes with a lower price tag (option B). Pitting A against B here doesn’t always yield a straightforward choice, but if option C rolls around that gets good gas mileage, looks visually appealing, and comes with a lower price tag, this car can look better than either of the previous options by comparison. This third option need not even better more appealing than both alternatives, however; simply being preferable to one of them is usually enough (Mercier & Sperber, 2011).

Related to this point, people might want to maintain some degree of justifiably in their choices as well. After all, we don’t just make choices in a vacuum; the decisions we make often have wider social ramifications, so making a choice that can be easily justified to others can make them accept your decisions more readily (even if the choice you make is overall worse for you). Sticking with our car example, if you were to select option A, you might be praised by your environmentally-conscience friends while mocked by your friends more concerned with the look of the car; if you choose option B a similar outcome might obtain, but the friends doing the praising and mocking could switch. However, option C might be a crowd pleaser for both groups, yielding a decision with greater approval (you miss out on the interior features you want, but that’s the price you pay for social acceptance). The general logic of this example should extend to a number of different domains both in terms of things you might select and features you might use as the basis to select them on. So long as your decisions need to be justified to others, the individual appeal of certain features can be trumped.

Whether these kinds of comparison effects exist across all domains is an open question, however. The adaptive problems species need to solve often require specific sets of cognitive mechanics, so the mental algorithms that are leveraged to solve problems relating to selecting a car (a rather novel issue at that) might not be the same that help solve other problems. Given that different learning mechanisms appear to underlie seemingly similar problems – like learning the location of food and water - there is some good theoretical reasons to suspect that these kinds of comparison effects might not exist in domains where decisions require less justification, such as selecting a mate. This brings us to the present research today by Tovee et al (2016) who were examining the matter of how attractive people perceive the bodies of others (in this case, women) to be.

“Well, that’s not exactly how the other participants posed, but we can make an exception”

Tovee et al (2016) were interested in finding out whether judging bodies among a large array of other bodies might influence the judgments on any individual body’s attractiveness. The goal here was to find out whether people’s bodies have an attractiveness value independent of the range of bodies they happen to be around, or whether attractiveness judgments are made in relation to immediate circumstances. To put that another way, if you’re a “5-out-of-10″ on your own, might standing next to a three (or several threes) make you look more like a six? This is a matter of clear empirical importance as, when studies of this nature are conducted, it is fairly common for participants to be rating a large number of targets for attractiveness one after the other. If attractiveness judgments are, in some sense, corrupted from previous images there are implications for both past and future research that make use of such methods.

So, to get at the matter, the researchers employed a straightforward strategy: first, they asked one group of 20 participants (10 males and females) to judge 20 images of female bodies for attractiveness (these bodies varied in their BMI and waist-to-hip ratio; all clothing was standardized and all faces blurred out). Following that, a group of 400 participants rated the same images, but this time only rating a single image rather than 20 of them, again providing 10 male and female ratings per picture. The logic of this method is simple: if ratings of attractiveness tend to change contingent on the array of bodies available, then the between-subjects group ratings should be expected to differ in some noticeable way than those of the within-subjects group.

Turning to the results, there was a very strong correspondence between male and female judgments of attractiveness (r = .95) as well as within sex agreement (Cronbach’s alphas of 0.89 and 0.95). People tended to agree that as BMI and WHR increased, the women’s bodies became less attractive (at least within the range of values examined; the results might look different if women with very low BMIs were examined). As it turns out, however, there were no appreciable differences when comparing the within- and between-groups attractiveness ratings. When people were making judgments of just a single picture, they delivered similar judgments to those presented with many bodies. The authors conclude that perceptions of attractiveness appear to be generated by (metaphorically) consulting an internal reference template, rather than such judgments being influenced by the range of available bodies.

Which is not to say that being the best looking member of group will hurt

These findings make quite a bit of sense in light of the job that judgments of physical attractiveness are supposed to accomplish; namely assessing traits like physical health, fertility, strength, and so on. If one is interested in assessing the probable fertility of a given female, that value should not be expected to change as a function of whom she happens to be standing next to. In a simple example, a male copulating with a post-menopausal female should not be expected to achieve anything useful (in the reproductive sense of word), and the fact that she happened to be around women who are even older or less attractive shouldn’t be expected to change that fact. Indeed, on theoretical level we shouldn’t expect the independent attractiveness value of a body to change based on the other bodies around; at least there doesn’t seem to be any obvious adaptive advantages to (incorrectly) perceive a five as a six because she’s around a bunch of threes, rather than just (accurately) perceiving that five as a five and nevertheless concluding she’s the most attractive of the current options. However, if you were to incorrectly perceive that five as a six, it might have some downstream consequences when future options present themselves (such as not pursuing a more attractive alternative because the risk vs. reward calculations are being made with inaccurate information). As usual, acting on accurate information tends to have more benefits that changing your perceptions of the world.

References: Mercier, H. & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 57-111.

Tovee, M., Taylor, J., & Cornelissen, P. (2016). Can we believe judgments of human physical attractiveness? Evolution & Human Behavior, doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.10.005

When It’s Not About Race Per Se

We can use facts about human evolutionary history to understand the shape of our minds; using it to understand people’s reactions to race is no exception. As I have discussed before, it is unlikely that ancestral human populations ever traveled far enough, consistently enough throughout our history as a species to have encountered members of other races with any regularity. Different races, in other words, were unlikely to be a persistent feature of our evolutionary history. As such, it seems correspondingly unlikely that human minds contain any modules that function to attend to race per se. Yet we do seem to automatically attend to race on a cognitive level (just as we do with sex and age), so what’s going on here? The best hypothesis I’ve seen as of yet is that people aren’t paying attention to race itself as much as they are using it as a proxy for something else that likely was recurrently relevant during our history: group membership and social coalitions (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). Indeed, when people are provided with alternate visual cues to group membership – such as different color shirts – the automaticity of race being attended to appears to be diminished, even to the point of being erased entirely at times.

Bright colors; more relevant than race at times

If people attend to race as a byproduct of our interest in social coalitions, then there are implications here for understanding racial biases as well. Specifically, it would seem unlikely for widespread racial biases to exist simply because of superficial differences like skin color or facial features; instead, it seems more likely that racial biases are a product of other considerations, such as the possibility that different groups – racial or otherwise – simply hold different values as social associates to others. For instance, if the best interests of group X are opposed to those group Y, then we might expect those groups to hold negative opinions of each other on the whole, since the success of one appears to handicap the success of the other (for an easy example of this, think about how more monogamous individuals tend to come into conflict with promiscuous ones). Importantly, to the extent that those best interests just so happen to correlate with race, people might mistake a negative bias due to varying social values or best interests for one due to race.

In case that sounds a bit too abstract, here’s an example to make it immediately understandable: imagine an insurance company that is trying to set its premiums only in accordance with risk. If someone lives in an area at a high risk of some negative outcome (like flooding or robbery), it makes sense for the insurance company to set a higher premium for them, as there’s a greater chance they will need to pay out; conversely, those in low-risk areas can pay reduced premiums for the same reason. In general, people have no problem with this idea of discrimination: it is morally acceptable to charge different rates for insurance based on risk factors. However, if that high-risk area just so happens to be one in which a particular racial group lives, then people might mistake a risk-based policy for a race-based one. In fact, in previous research, certain groups (specifically liberal ones) generally say it is unacceptable for insurance companies to require those living in high-risk areas pay higher premiums if they happen to be predominately black (Tetlock et al, 2000).

Returning the main idea at hand, previous research in psychology has tended to associate conservatives – but not liberals – with prejudice. However, there has been something of a confounding factor in that literature (which might be expected, given that academics in psychology are overwhelmingly liberal): specifically, much of that literature on prejudice asks about attitudes towards groups whose values tend to lean more towards the liberal side of the political spectrum, like homosexual, immigrant, and black populations (groups that might tend to support things like affirmative action, which conservative groups would tend to oppose). When that confound is present, then it’s not terribly surprising that conservatives would look more prejudiced, but that prejudice might ultimately have little to do with the target’s race or sexual orientation per se.  More specifically, if animosity between different racial groups is due primarily to a factor like race itself, then you might expect those negative feelings to persist even in the face of compatible values. That is, if a white person happens to not like black people because they are black, then the views of a particular black person shouldn’t be liable to change those racist sentiments too much. However, if those negative attitudes are instead more of a product of a perceived conflict of values, then altering those political or social values should dampen or remove the effects of race altogether. 

Shaving the mustache is probably a good place to start

This idea was tested by Chambers et al (2012) over the course of three studies. The first of these involved 170 Mturk participants who indicated their own ideological position (strongly liberal to strongly conservative, 5-point scale), their impressions of 34 different groups (in terms of whether they’re usually liberal or conservative on the same scale, as well as how much they liked the target group), as well as a few other measures related to the prejudice construct, like system justification and modern racism. As it turns out, both liberals and conservatives tended to agree with one another about how liberal or conservative the target groups tended to be (r = .97), so their ratings were averaged. Importantly, when the target group in question tended to be liberal (such as Feminists or Atheists), liberals tended to have higher favorability ratings of them (M = 3.48) than did conservatives (M = 2.57; d = 1.23); conversely, when the target group was perceived as conservative (such as business people or the elderly), liberals now tended to have lower favorability ratings (M = 2.99) of them than conservatives (M = 3.86; d = 1.22). In short, liberals tended to feel positive about liberals, and conservatives tended to feel positive about conservatives. The more extreme the perceived political differences of the target were, the larger these biases were (r = .84). Further, when group memberships needed to be chosen, the biases were larger than when they were involuntary (e.g., as a group, “feminist”s generated more bias from liberals and conservatives than “women”).

Since that was all correlational, studies 2 and 3 took a more experimental approach. Here, participants were exposed to a target whose race (white/black) and positions (conservatives or liberal) were manipulated on six different issues (welfare, affirmative action, wealth redistribution, abortion, gun control, and the Iraq war).In study 2 this was done on a within-subjects basis with 67 participants, and in study 3 it was done between-subjects with 152 participants. In both cases, however, the results were similar: in general, the results showed that while the target’s attitudes mattered when it came to how much the participants liked them, the target’s race did not. Liberals didn’t like black targets who disagreed any more than conservatives did. The conservatives happened to like the targets who expressed conservative views more, whereas liberals tended to like targets who expressed liberal views more. The participants had also provided scores on measures of system justification, modern racism, and attitudes towards blacks. Even when these factors were controlled for, however, the pattern of results remained: people tended to react favorably towards those who shared views and unfavorably to those who did not. The race of the person with those views seemed besides the point for both liberals and conservatives. Not to hammer the point home too much, but perceiving ideological agreement – not race – was doing the metaphorical lifting here. 

Now perhaps these results would have looked different if the samples in question were comprised of people who held, more or less, extreme and explicit racist views; the type of people would wouldn’t want to live next to someone of a different race. While that’s possible, there are a few points to make about that suggestion: first, it’s becoming increasing difficult to find people who hold such racist or sexist views, despite certain rhetoric to the contrary; that’s the reason researchers ask about “symbolic” or “modern” or “implicit” racism, rather than just racism. Such openly-racist individuals are clearly the exceptions, rather than the rule. This brings me to the second point, which is that, even if biases did look different among the hardcore racists (we don’t know if they do), for more average people, like the kind in these studies, there doesn’t appear to be a widespread problem with race per se; at least not if the current data have any bearing on the matter. Instead, it seems possible that people might be inferring a racial motivation where it doesn’t exist because of correlations with race (just like in our insurance example).

Pictured: unusual people; not everyone you disagree with

For some, the reaction to this finding might be to say that it doesn’t matter. After all, we want to reduce racism, so being incredibly vigilant for it should ensure that we catch it where it exists, rather than miss it or make it seem permissible. Now that likely true enough, but there are other considerations to add into that equation. One of them is that by reducing your type-two errors (failing to see racism where it exists) you increase your type-one errors (seeing racism where there is none). As long as accusations of being a racist are tied to social condemnation (not praise; a fact alone which ought to tell you something), you will be harming people by overperceiving the issue. Moreover, if you perceive racism where it doesn’t exist too often, you will end up with people who don’t take your claims of racism seriously anymore. Another point to make is that if you’re actually serious about addressing a social problem you see, accurately understanding its causes will go a long way. That is to say that time and energy invested in interventions to reduce racism is time not spent trying to address other problems. If you have misdiagnosed the issue you seek to tackle as being grounded in race, then your efforts to address it will be less successful than they otherwise could be, not unlike a doctor prescribing the wrong medication to treat an infection.          

References: Chambers, J., Schlenker, B., & Collisson, B. (2012). Ideology and prejudice: The role of value conflicts. Psychological Science, 24, 140-149.

Kurzban, R., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2001). Can race be erased? Coalitional computation and social categorization. PNAS, 98, 15387-15392.

Tetlock, P., Kristel, O., Elson, S., Green, M., & Lerner, J. (2000). The psychology of the unthinkable: Taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78 (5), 853-870 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.78.5.853

Violence In Games Does Not Cause Real-Life Violence

Violence is a strategic act. What I mean by this is that a threat to employ physical aggression against someone else unless they do what you want is one that needs to be credible to be useful. If a 5-year-old child threatened to beat up her parents if they don’t stop for ice cream, the parents understand that the child does not actually pose a real physical risk and, if push came to shove, the parents would win a physical contest; by contrast, if you happen to be hanging out with a heavy-weight MMA fighter and he demands you pull over for ice cream, you should be more inclined to take his request seriously. If you cannot realistically threaten others with credible claims of violence – if you are not likely to be able to inflict harmful costs on others physically – then posturing aggressively shouldn’t be expected to do you any favors; if anything, adopting aggressive stances you cannot back up will result in your suffering costs inflicted by others, and that’s generally an outcome to be avoided. It’s for this reason that – on a theoretical level – we should have expected research on power poses to fail to replicate: simply acting more dominant will not make you more able to actually back up those boasts, and people shouldn’t be expected to take such posturing seriously. If you apply that same logic to nonhumans – say Rams – a male who behaves dominantly will occasionally encourage another male who will challenge that dominance. If neither backs down the result is a physical conflict, and the subsequent realization that writing metaphorical checks you cannot cash is a bad idea.

“You have his attention; sure hope you also have a thick skull, too”

This cursory analysis already suggests there might be a theoretical problem with the idea that people who are exposed to violent content in media will subsequently become more aggressive in real life. Yes, watching Rambo or playing Dark Souls might inspire some penchant for spilling fantasy blood (at least in the short term), but seeing violence doesn’t suddenly increase the advisability of your pursuing such a strategy, as you are no more likely to be able effectively employ it than you were before your exposure. Again, to place that in a nonhuman example (always a good idea when you’re dealing with psychology research to see if an idea still make sense; if it only makes sense for humans, odds are it’s lacking in interpretation), if you exposed a male ram to media depicting males aggressively slamming their horns into other males, that doesn’t suddenly mean your subject ram will be inspired to run out and challenge a rival. His chances of winning that contest haven’t changed, so why should his behavior?

Now the matter is more complex than this analysis lets on, admittedly, but it does give us something of a starting point for understanding why violent content in media – video games in particular – should not be expected to have uniform or lasting impacts on the player’s subsequent behavior. Before I get into the empirical side of this issue, however, I think it’s important I lay my potential bias on the table: I’m a gamer; have been my entire life, at least as far as I can remember. I’ve played games in all sorts of mediums – video, card, board, and sometimes combinations of those – and across a variety of genres, including violent ones. As such, when I see someone leveling accusations against one of my more cherished hobbies, my first response is probably defensive. That is, I don’t perceive people who research the link between violent games and aggression to be doing so for no particular reason; I assume they have some specific goals in mind (consciously understood or not) that center around telling other people what they shouldn’t do or enjoy, perhaps even ranging as far as trying to build a case for the censorship of such materials. As such, I’m by no means an unbiased observed in this matter, but I am also something of an expert in the subject matter as well, which can provide me with insights that others might not possess.

That disclaimer out the way, I wanted to examine some research today which examines the possibility that the relationship people have sometimes spotted between violent video game content and aggression isn’t casual (Przybylski et al, 2014; I say sometimes because apparently this link between the two is inconsistently present, possibly only short-term in nature, and the subject of some debate). The thrust of this paper focuses on the idea that human aggression (proximately) is a response to having one’s psychological needs thwarted. I think there are better ways to think about what aggression is, but this general idea is probably close enough to that truth to do us just fine. In brief, the idea motivating this paper is that people play video games (again, proximately), in part, because they provide feelings of competency and skill growth. Something about the challenges games offers to be overcome proves sufficiently motivating for players to get pleasure out of the experience. Importantly, this should hold true across gaming content: people don’t find content appealing because it is violent generally, but rather because it provides us abilities to test, display, and strengthen certain competencies. As such, manipulating the content of the games (from violent to non-violent) should be much less effective at causing subsequent aggression than manipulating the difficulty of the game (from easy/intuitive to difficult/confusing).    

“I’ll teach him a lesson about beating me in Halo”

This is a rather important factor to consider because the content of a game (whether it is violent or not, for instance) might be related to how difficult the game is to learn or master. As such, if researchers have been trying to vary the content without paying much mind to the other factors that correlate with it, that could handicap the usefulness of subsequent interpretations. Towards that end, Przybylski et al (2014) report on the results of seven studies designed to examine just that issue. I won’t be able to go over all of them in depth, but try to provide a general adequate summary of their methods and findings. In their first study, they examined how 99 participants reacted to playing a simple but non-violent game (about flying a paper airplane through rings) or a complex but violent one (a shooter with extensive controls). The players were then asked about their change in aggressive feelings (pre- and post-test difference) and mastery of the controls. The quick summary of the results was that aggressive content did not predict change in aggression scores above and beyond the effects of frustrations over the controls, while the control scores did predict aggression.

Their second study actually manipulated the content and complexity factors (N = 101). Two versions of the same game (Half-Life 2) were created, such that one contained violent content and the other did not, while the overall environment and difficulty were held constant. Again, there were no effects of content on aggression, but there was an effect of perceived mastery. In other words, people felt angry when they were frustrated with the game; not because of the content. Their third study (N = 104) examined what happened when a non-violent puzzle game (Tetris) was modified to either contain simple or complex control interface. As before, those who had to deal with the frustrating controls were quicker to access aggressive thoughts and terms than those in the intuitive control condition. Study 4 basically repeated that design with some additional variables and found the same type of results: perceived competency in the game correlated negatively with aggression and that people become more aggressive the less they enjoyed the game, among a few other things.The fifth study had 112 participants all play a complex game that was either (a) violent or non-violent, but also gave them either (b) 10 minutes of practice time with the game or no experience with it. As expected, there was an effect of being able to practice on subsequent aggression, but no effect of violent content.

Study 6 asked participants to first submerge their arm in ice water for 25 seconds (a time period ostensibly determined by the last participant), then play a game of Tetris for a few minutes that was modified to be either easy or difficult (but not because of the controls this time). Those assigned to play the more difficult version of Tetris also reported more aggressive feelings, and assigned the next subject to submerge their arm for about 30 seconds in the ice water (relative to the 22 second average assignment in the easy group). The final study surveyed regular players about their experiences gaming over the last month and aggressive feelings, again finding that the ratings of content did not predict aggressive self-reported reactions to gaming, but frustrations with playing the game did.

“I’m going to find the developer of this game and kill him for it!”

In summation, then, violent content per se does not appear to make players more aggressive; instead, frustration and losing seem to play a much larger role. It is at this point that my experience as a gamer comes in handy, because such an insight should be readily apparent to anyone who has watched many other people play games. As an ever-expanding library of YouTube rage-quit videos document, a gamer can become immediately enraged by losing at almost any game, regardless of the content (for those of you not in the know, rage-quitting refers to aggressively quitting out of a game following a loss, often accompanied by yelling, frustrating, and broken controllers). I’ve seen people losing their minds over shooters, sports games, card games, board games, and storming off while shouting. Usually such outbursts are short-term affairs – you don’t see that person the next day and notice they’re visibly more aggressive towards others indiscriminately – but the important part is that they almost always occur in response to losses (and usually losses deemed to be unfair, in some sense).

As a final thought, in addition to the introductory analysis and empirical evidence presented here, there are other reasons one might not predict that violent content per se would be related to subsequent aggression even if one wants to hold onto the idea that mere exposure to content is enough to alter future behavior. In this case, most of the themes found within games that have violent content are not violence and aggression as usually envisioned (like The Onion‘s piece on Close Range: the video game about shooting people point blank in the face). Instead, those themes usually focus on the context in which that violence is used: defeating monsters or enemies that threaten the safety of you or others, killing corrupt and dangerous individuals in positions of power, or getting revenge for past wrongs. Those themes are centered more around heroism and self-defense than aggression for the sake of violence. Despite that, I haven’t heard of many research projects examining whether playing such violent games could lead to increased psychological desires to be helpful, or encourage people to take risks to save others from suffering costs.

References: Przybylski, A., Rigby, C., Deci, E., & Ryan, R. (2014). Competent-impeding electronic games and players’ aggressive feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 16, 441-457.

Money For Nothing, But The Chicks Aren’t Free

When people see young, attractive women in relationships with older and/or unattractive men, the usual perception that comes to mind is that the relationship revolves around money. This perception is usual because it tends to be accurate: women do, in fact, tend to prefer men who both have access to financial resources and who are willing to share them.  What is rather notable is that the reverse isn’t quite as a common: a young, attractive man shacking up with an older, rich woman just doesn’t call too many examples to mind. Women seem to have a much more pronounced preference for men with wealth than men have for women. While examples of such preferences playing themselves out in real life exist anecdotally, it’s always good to try and showcase their existence empirically.

Early attempts were made by Dr. West, but replications are required

This brings me to a new paper by Arnocky et al (2016) that examined how altruism affects mating success in humans (as this is still psychology research, “humans” translates roughly as “undergraduate psychology majors”, but such is the nature of convenience samples). The researchers first sought (a) to document that more altruistic people really were preferred as mating partners (spoilers: they are), and then (b) to try and explain why we might expect them to be. Let’s begin with what they found, as that much is fairly straightforward. In their first study, Arnocky et al (2016) recruited 192 women and 105 men from a Canadian university and asked them to complete a few self-report measures: an altruism scale (used to measure general dispositions towards providing aid to others when reciprocation is unlikely), a mating success scale (measuring perceptions of how desirable one tends to be towards the opposite sex), their numbers of lifetime sexual partners, as well as the number of those that were short-term, the number of times over the last month they had sex with their current partner (if they had one, which about 40% did), and a measure of their personality more generally.

These measures were then entered into a regression (controlling for personality). When it came to predicting perceived mating success, reported altruism was a significant predictor (ß = 0.25), but neither sex nor the altruism-sex interaction was. This suggests that both men and women tend become more attractive to the opposite sex if they behave more altruistically (or, conversely, that people who are more selfish are less desirable, which sounds quite plausible). However, what it means for one to be successful in the mating domain varies by sex: for men, having more sexual partners usually implies a greater level of success, whereas the same does not hold true for women as often (as gametes are easy to obtain for women, but investment is difficult). In accordance with this point, it was also found that altruism predicted the number of lifetime sexual partners overall (ß = .16), but this effect was specific to men: more altruistic men had more sexual partners (and more casual ones), whereas more altruistic women did not. Finally, within the contexts of existing relationships, altruism also (sort of) predicted the number of times someone had sex with their partner in the last month (ß = .27); while there was not a significant interaction with sex, a visual inspection of the provided graphs suggest that if this effect existed, it was being predominately carried by altruistic women having more sex within a relationship; not the men.

Now that’s all well and good, but the authors wanted to go a little further. In their second study, rather than just asking participants about how altruistic they were, they offered participants the opportunity to be altruistic: after completing the survey, participants could indicate how much (if any) of their earnings they wanted to donate to a charity of their choice. That way, you get what might be a less-biased measure of one’s actual altruism (rather than their own perception of it). Another 335 women and 189 men were recruited for this second phase and, broadly, the results follow the same general pattern, but there were some notable differences. In terms of mating success, actual altruistic donations (categorized as either making a donation or not, rather than the amount donated) were not a good predictor (ß = -.07). In terms of number of lifetime dating and sexual partners, however, the donation-by-sex interaction was significant, indicating that more charitable men – but not women – had a greater number of relationships and sexual partners (perhaps suggesting that charitable men tend to have more, but shorter, relationships, which isn’t necessarily a good thing for the women involved). Donations also failed to predict the amount of sex participants had been having in their relationship in the last month.

Guess the blood drive just isn’t a huge turn on after all

With these results in mind, there are two main points I wanted to draw attention to. The first of these concerns the measures of altruism in general: effectively charitable behaviors to strangers. While such a behavior might be a more “pure” form of altruistic tendencies as compared with, say, helping a friend move or giving money to your child, it does pose some complications for the present topic. Specifically, when looking for a desirable mate, people might not want someone who is just generally altruistic. After all, it doesn’t always do me much good if my committed partner is spending time and investing resources in other people. I would probably prefer that resources be preferentially directed at me and those I care about, rather than strangers, and I might especially dislike it if altruism directed towards strangers came at my expense (as the same resources can’t be invested in me and someone else most of the time). While it is possible that such investments in strangers could return to me later in the form of them reciprocating such aid to my partner, it seems unlikely that deficit would be entirely and consistently made up, let alone surpassed.

To make the point concrete, if someone was equally altruistic towards all people, there would be little point in forming as kind of special relationship with that kind person (friendships or otherwise) because you’d get the same benefits from them regardless of how much you invested in them (even if that amount was nothing).

This brings me to the second point I wanted to discuss: the matter of why people like the company of altruists. There are two explanations that come to mind. The first explanation is simple: people like access to resources, and altruists tend to provide them. This explanation should hardly require much in the way of testing given its truth is plainly obvious. The second explanation is more complex, and it’s one the authors favor: altruism honestly signals some positive, yet difficult-to-observe quality about the altruist. For instance, if I were to donate blood, or my time to clean up a park, this would tell you something about my underlying genetic qualities, as an individual in worse condition couldn’t shoulder the costs of altruism effectively. In this sense, altruism functions in a comparable manner to a peacock’s tail feathers; it’s a biologically-honest signal because it’s costly.

While it does have some plausibility, this signaling explanation runs into some complications. First, as the authors note, women donated more than men did (70% to 57%), despite donating predicting sexual behavior better for men. If women were donating to signal some positive qualities in the mating domain, it’s not at all clear it was working. Further, patterns of charitable donations in the US show a U-shaped distribution, whereby those with access to the most and  the fewest financial resources tend to donate more than those in the middle. This seems like a pattern the signaling explanation should not predict if altruism is meaningfully and consistently tied to important, but difficult-to-observe biological characteristics. Finally, while the argument could be made that altruism directed towards friends, sexual partners, and kin are not necessarily indicative of someone’s willingness to donate to strangers (i.e., how altruistic they are dispositionally might not predict how nepotistic they are), well, that’s kind of a problem for the altruism-as-signaling model. If donations towards strangers are fairly unpredictive of altruism towards closer relations, then they don’t really tell you what you want to know.  Specifically, if you want to know how good of a friend or dating partner someone would be for you, a better cue is how much altruism they direct towards their friends and romantic partners; not how much they direct to strangers.

“My boyfriend is so altruistic, buying drinks for other women like that”

Last, we can consider the matter of why people behave altruistically, with respect to the mating domain. (Very) broadly speaking, there are two primary challenges people need to overcome: attracting a mate and retaining them. Matters get tricky here, as altruism can be used for both of these tasks. As such, a man who is generally altruistic towards lot of people might be using altruism as a means of attracting the attention of prospective mates without necessarily intending to keep them around. Indeed, the previous point about how altruistic men report having more relationships and sexual partners could be interpreted in just such a light. There are other explanations, of course, such as the prospect that generally selfish people simply don’t have many relationships at all, but these need to be separated out. In either case, in terms of how much altruism we provide to others, I suspect that the amount provided to strangers and charitable organizations only makes up a small fraction; we give much more towards friends, family, and lovers regularly. If that’s the case, measuring someone’s willingness to donate in those fairly uncommon contexts might not capture their desirability as partner as well as we would like.

References: Arnocky, S., Piche, T., Albert, G., Ouellette, D., & Barclay, P. (2016). Altruism predicts mating success in humans. British Journal of Psychology, DOI:10.1111/bjop.12208